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ABSTRACT

Ten selected papers and a panel discussion are included in these conference proceedings. The first paper is entitled "The Emergence of Women in Twentieth-Century Chilean History and Literature" (Caroline Richards). The second paper is "Attitudes Toward Gender in Two Cultures: Puerto Rico and the United States" (Margaret Berrio, Maria Fernandez, Debbie Hinkle, and Vicky Phillips). The third paper, "Still Crazy After All These Years: The Uses of Madness in Women's Fiction" (Gail Griffin), compares and contrasts the uses of female madness in five fictional works. The fourth paper, "Feminist Counseling" (Anna DiStefano), examines counseling from a feminist perspective. Other papers include "A Dialogue, Critical Issues in Women's Studies: Race, Class, and Sexual Orientation" (Eva Hooker and Anna DiStefano), "Women, Reproductive Freedom, and the Law: A Selected Annotated Bibliography" (Patricia A. Langley), "The Art of Quilting: Thoughts from a Contemporary Quilter" (Joyce Parr), "Two in One, One in Two: An Exploration of a Birth Experience and Images of the Sacred" (Ronald L. Massanari), "Can a Man Teach Women's Studies?" (Cyrus W. Banning), and "Analyzing Discrimination Against Women in the Labor Market--A Few Lessons from John Stuart Mill" (Robin Klay). A selection from the closing panel entitled "Women's Studies and the Re-Vision of Liberal Education: 'What is a Nice Girl/Boy Like You Doing Here?'" (Jane Dickie) and a schedule of conference events conclude the document. (LH)

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# Toward a Feminist Transformation of the Academy: III

*Proceedings of the Seventh Annual GLCA Women's Studies Conference*

*November 6-8, 1981*

**Edited by Beth Reed**
**Editorial Committee: Jane Dickie, Gail Griffin, and Kathryn Schwartz**

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Women's Studies Program

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The Great Lakes Colleges Association includes the following institutions:

Albion College, Antioch College, Denison University, DePauw University, Earlham College, Hope College, Kalamazoo College, Kenyon College, Oberlin College, Ohio Wesleyan University, Wabash College, and The College of Wooster.

# THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHILEAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE

Caroline Richards, Earlham College

As in most Latin American countries, women in Chile, until recent times, received little attention from historians and scholars, and there are few sources written by women in the distant past which illumine for us their experiences and perceptions. It is clear, however, that from the colonial period through the nineteenth century the most widely admired type of female was the submissive woman who obeyed husband and priest. Indeed, what we know about the women of the earlier epochs comes largely from sermons condemning women of the higher orders for their addiction to luxury and showing off and their poorer sisters for their laziness and debauchery.[1] It was only in the twentieth century that numerous women began to speak for themselves. As they learned to articulate their concerns, they also altered the world in which they lived. This paper seeks to account for some of the distinctive turns women's history has taken in Chile during this century, and especially since 1973, when the collapse of democracy suddenly created an unprecedented and formidable challenge to the majority of the country's women.

During the latter nineteenth century, Chile was unique among Latin American nations for her stable institutions, her growing economy, and her active cultural and social life. Perhaps for these reasons the country was more open to secularizing tendencies than some of her neighbors. Unlike Peru and Bolivia, for instance, where girls' schools run by nuns prepared girls only for marriage and motherhood, Chile boasted institutions of higher learning which also permitted women to train for professional life. In 1887, for example, the first women medical doctors in Chile received their degrees.[2] It is notable that during the same period, a women's movement made its first appearance. Largely middle class in social composition, it proposed an alternative to traditional ideas about woman's role and encouraged women to enlarge their mental horizons.

The movement for female suffrage began in 1915 with the foundation of a reading circle made up of university and professional women. It was the first club of its kind and the first women's group to be organized without clerical sponsorship. The club met opposition not only from conservative men and women but also from the many church leaders who declared the discussion of social and political ideas by women to be unacceptable. Women's suffrage, however, was even worse: In 1917, when suffrage began to be discussed, women who advocated it were threatened with excommunication from the church.[3]

Between 1919 and 1940, many groups of women organized to work for women's suffrage and women's rights. The same women appeared over and

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1. See, for instance, Isaac Joslin Cox, tr., Luis Galdames, A History of Chile (Chapel Hill, 1941), 137.
2. Elsa M. Chaney, "Old and New Feminists in Latin America: The Case of Peru and Chile," Journal of Marriage and the Family, May, 1973, 332.
3. Ibid., 337.

over again as leaders and the same type of women continued to join the women's groups: middle-class women with little interest in or knowledge of the great majority of Chilean women. However, women of the pueblo--working-class women and peasants--were exposed during those years to the wealth of political and philosophical debate fostered by Chile's many political parties and active labor unions. By 1944, when the first National Congress of Women was held, there were women in every political party. By that time the movement for women's rights had finally begun to awaken mass support. The National Congress of Women, temporarily overcoming the political differences among its members, formed a Federation of Women's Organizations which incorporated leaders of all ideologies from extreme right to extreme left. But in 1949, once suffrage was obtained, the women's federation fell apart and, since that time, Chilean women have never achieved the degree of oganization they attained in the 1940's. One reason is that fierce party and class conflict made it extremely difficult for women to work together. Another is that the movement for women's suffrage did not challenge the traditional image of the woman. A number of analysts have observed that the suffrage movement actually encouraged the notion that women's votes would infuse society with "womanly virtues."

During these decades, when some women were breaking political barriers, others were making inroads into Chile's artistic and literary life. It is tempting to view Gabriela Mistral, one of Chile's two Nobel Laureates and probably, after Pablo Neruda, the country's most famous poet, as a woman posed between two worlds. On the one hand, as a childless widow--her husband had committed suicide--she threw herself into a professional life that was remarkably successful. Born in a poor village in northern Chile near the foot of the Andes, she began at age fifteen to devote herself to teaching farm children, eventually becoming Director of Schools for all of Chile. In 1922, she was invited to Mexico to help organize the rural school system and then, in 1924, she came to the United States, where she served as a visiting professor at several colleges.

As a famous poet and educator with origins in the pueblo, devoted to work rather than to home and family life, totally uninterested in appearing feminine or charming, Mistral was a novelty, a harbinger of things to come. Yet a great deal--perhaps most--of her poetry is maternal and pious, an affirmation of the importance of mothering. The poem, "For Children," illustrates well the direction of Mistral's vision as well as her craftsmanship; at the same time it suggests why, in spite of her unorthodox life, Mistral strikes us as being a traditional "woman's" poet:

> Many years from now, when I am a little mound of silent dust,
> play with me, with the earth of my heart and my bones.
> Should a mason gather me up, he would make me into a brick,
> and I would be stuck forever in a wall,
> and I hate quiet corners.
> If they put me into the wall of a prison,
> I would blush with shame at hearing a man sob.
> Or if I became the wall of a school,
> I would suffer from not being able to sing with you in the mornings.
> I had rather be dust that you play with on the country roads.
> Pound me, because I have been yours.
> Scatter me, as I did you.

Stomp me because I never gave you truth entire and beauty whole.
O, I mean, sing and run above me
that I might kiss your precious footprints.
Say a pretty verse when you have me in your hands,
and I will run with pleasure through your fingers.
Uplifted at the sight of you,
in your eyes I will look for the curly heads of those I taught.
And when you have made of me some sort of statue,
shatter it each time,
as each time before children shattered me
in tenderness and sorrow.[4]

Gabriela Mistral was the first Chilean to illustrate by her example that sex is no barrier to artistic genius. It was inevitable that other women should follow suit. During the years since 1945, when Mistral received the Nobel Prize, women from every background and political persuasion have achieved recognition for their competence as writers, musicians, and artists. Ironically, however, it was Violeta Parra, another child of the pueblo, who acquired an international reputation for the remarkable range and quality of her works.

As Mistral embodied traditional Chilean values, Parra in her life and work suggested new possibilities and an awakened political consciousness. The only circumstance the two artists shared was their poverty. Whereas Mistral wrote about children, Parra wrote about romantic love and the oppression of the poor. Whereas Mistral was pious and conservative, Violeta was a rebel. Indeed, many of Parra's works have been prohibited by the present government, since numerous poems are songs of protest, and even the sound of her voice reminds people of the flowering of the left and of the Popular Unity Government of Salvador Allende.

Yet Parra has become widely known outside of Chile. Since her suicide in 1966, attributed to depression caused by a love affair with a youth about thirty years younger than herself, her songs have been popularized by her remarkably gifted children, now in exile, and by her brother Nicanor, also a noted poet. People familiar with Violeta's work have become devoted to her accomplishment and fascinated by her personality. As one scholar has put it, "Her life, full of difficulties, her strong character, irascible and tender at the same time, her drive to carry through with her work, her suicide: all have made of her a national character . . . . Surely she could see further, much further, than her time."[5]

Violeta began her professional life in the 1950's, when she and her sister toured Chilean bars singing Mexican songs, waltzes, and cuecas. Violeta's voice was in truth undistinguished. The sisters were probably typical members of the shabby order of itinerant entertainers. What made Violeta exceptional was her passion for Chilean folk culture. In whatever remote village she found herself, at whichever festival or rodeo, she preserved on her tape recorder the music of the people. Almost single-handedly, she acquainted

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4. Langston Hughes, tr., Gabriela Mistral, Selected Poems (Bloomington, Indiana, 1957).
5. Violeta Parra, 21 Son Los Dolores (Santiago, Chile, 1980), from the introduction by Juan Andres Pina.

Chileans with a fact that had almost escaped notice: Chile had an authentic folk culture with its own instruments and rhythms and harmonies. Her research was the beginning of a great awakening in the national consciousness; soon a host of fine musicians were following her example.

But Violeta was not only a researcher and interpreter. She was also an inspired composer. All of her works are in traditional rhythms—they are subtitled with musical terms exotic and unfamiliar to our ears but typically Chilean: refalos, tonada, cueca, sirilla. But while they imitate provincial colloquial models, they also transcend them, refine them. That is why her music has met with acclaim outside of Chile.

The following songs, with their romantic elements and intricate rhythms, are typical of Parra's artistry:

Corazon Maldito
(Sirilla-Cancion)

Corazon, contesta
por que palpitas, si, por que palpitas,
como una campana
que se encabrita, si, que se encabrita.
Por que palpitas?

No ves que la noche
la paso en vela, si, la paso en vela,
como en mar violento
la carabela, si, la carabela?
Tu me desvelas.

Cual es mi pecado
pa maltratarme, si, pa matratarme,
como el prisionero
por los gendarmes, si, por los gendarmes?
Quieres matarme.

Pero a ti te ocultan
duras paredes, si, duras paredes
y mi sangre oprimes
entre tus redes, si, entre tus redes.
Por que no cedes?

Corazon maldito
sin miramiento, si, sin miramiento,
ciego, sordo y mudo
de nacimiento, si, de nacimiento.
Me das tormento.[6]

Accursed Heart

Answer me, heart
Why do you beat, yes, why do you beat
like a bell
that thinks it's a baby goat, yes, that
acts like a silly kid
Why do you beat?

Don't you see that the night
I spend awake, yes, I stay awake
as on a stormy sea
in a tiny boat, yes, tossed in a tiny boat
You keep me awake.

What is my sin
that you mistreat me, yes, you mistreat me
as a prisoner
is mistrusted by the guards, yes, by
the guards?
You want to kill me.

But you hide behind
The walls of my body, yes, behind the
walls
and you oppress my blood.
You hold my blood in your nets, yes,
trapped in your nets.
Why don't you let it go?

Accursed heart
Without looking, yes, without looking
blind, deaf, and dumb
from birth, yes, from birth.
You torment me.

6. Ibid., 37.

Volver A Los 17
(Sirilla-Cancion)

Volver a los diecisiete
despues de vivir un siglo
es como descifrar signos
sin ser sabio competente,
volver a ser de repente
tan fragil como un segundo,
volver a sentir profundo
como un nino frente a Dios,
eso es lo que siento yo
en este instante fecundo.

Mi paso retrocedido
cuando el de ustedes avanza,
el arco de las alianzas
ha penetrado en mi nido,
con todo su colorido
se ha paseado por mis venas
y hasta la dura cadena
con que nos ata el destino
es como un diamante fino
que alumbra mi alma serena.

Lo que puede el sentimiento
no lo ha podido el saber,
ni el mas claro proceder
ni el mas ancho pensamiento,
todo lo cambia el momento
cual mago condescendiente
nos aleja dulcemente
de rencores y violencias,
solo el amor can su ciencia
nos vuelve tan inocentes.[7]

"I'm Seventeen Again"

I'm seventeen years old
After living a century
I can read secrets again without
learning how. Again
I'm susceptible, I
can break again and
return to myself again, like
a child who knows God.

I grew young while
everyone else grew old, the
rainbow of new love
came into my nest,
with all its colors it
entered my body,
and even the chains
that tie us to our fate
became bright diamonds
lighting my soul.

What sentiment does to me
Knowledge knows not how
Understanding understands not
what
Thinking thinks not why
The sweet moment is
The magician who takes away
All violence and rancor, who
Takes me back
To innocence.

Violeta Parra dominated Chilean cultural life during a time of tremendous artistic and political vitality. The aspirations of the pueblo which she represented, however, were frustrated by the coup which overthrew the Allende government in 1973. Since that time, expressions of popular culture have been very much restricted in the mass media. Losing the hard-won political and economic gains wrested over the course of a century, the pueblo has had to face incredible obstacles just to survive. The challenge has been especially trying for women. They have learned to cope with their difficult situation in remarkable ways, however, and they are expressing themselves in new and exciting artistic ventures.

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7. Ibid., 31.

In 1980, I conducted numerous interviews with women from the slums of Santiago and also from the countryside around Osorno.[8] Over and over again, they testified to the challenges they have faced since 1973. Frequently, wife and mother have merged as the head of the household. In some cases, husbands have been executed or have disappeared. (The Catholic Church has documented over 600 cases of disappeared persons, but there are probably many more). In other cases, men left Chile to seek work. But even in families where the husband has remained at home, there is frequently no work, for the rate of unemployment has been very high in Chile and people are often fired for political reasons. As a result, many women have become breadwinners as well as mothers. When the husband is gone, the woman must struggle alone; when he is at home but unemployed, the situation is frequently worse, since he feels demoralized and "unmanned" because he cannot support a family. Sometimes there is a drinking problem or wife and child abuse.

Faced with these overwhelming burdens and deprived of the support of the traditional family structure, women have turned to each other. Under the protection of the Catholic Church, new organizations have appeared, like the "Relatives of the Disappeared" groups, the "Relatives of the Executed," and "The Relatives of Political Prisoners." Membership in such groups is about ninety-eight percent female. Although supported in part by the Catholic Church, the groups are run exclusively by the members themselves. They provide moral support to one another; they seek employment; they publicize their plight. Most of all, they create a loving, caring environment in which women bereft of family members or material support can renew themselves and face life.

In Santiago, members of the "Relatives of the Disappeared" group told me proudly about their accomplishments. During the long years since the coup, they have been the only people with the courage to strike. Chaining themselves to UN buildings, staging sit-ins in churches, conducting press conferences with foreign correspondents, they have publicized their situation and have occasionally forced the government to pay attention to them. "We will never be the same," women from the Santiago group told me. "Before, we were only housewives, not especially interested in politics. Now we have developed leadership skills, we have learned how to study together, and we've been arrested together. Our men are dead, or they are thoroughly intimidated by the government. We women have nothing to lose. That is why we will be in the forefront in the struggle to overthrow this government."

In Osorno, in the rainforests of the South, the women's groups showed the same spirit. One woman, a pharmacist, told me, "When we began meeting in 1975, I was the only middle-class person, the only professional. The peasant women from the countryside were so shy they wouldn't open their mouths. They were so uninterested in politics, so uninformed, that some of them didn't know what political posts their husbands had filled when they

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8. An account of my interview with a peasant woman from southern Chile, who miraculously escaped murder by a firing squad immediately after the coup of 1973, can be found in my article, "Wintering in Southern Chile," (Minnesota Review, Spring, 1982), 37-40.

were arrested and disappeared. But now we are a family of sisters; nothing could separate us. We have formed study groups, we have pooled our resources to keep one another going, we have publicized our predicament. Every year we hold a bazaar to raise money so that the children can receive Christmas presents. We have a dream of renting a house here in Osorno where the children from the countryside can live while they pursue their studies."

These support groups, and others like them, represent, I think, the coming of age of the great majority of Chilean women. Rather than being guided or instructed, pushed and pulled, by husband or priest, the women are creating their own organizations and taking their own risks. As far as I'm concerned, their solidarity groups are works of art.

At the same time, their experiences are being transformed into tangible works of art. Unemployed women from the slums of Santiago, for instance, make wall-hangings called arpilleras which graphically describe their situation. The arpilleras are marketed abroad by the Catholic organizations.

The experience of these women has also given rise to experiments in drama and song. In 1979, for instance, a dramatic work called "Three Marias and a Rose" opened in downtown Santiago. It depicts the daily life of four women from the slums who earn their meager wages by making arpilleras. No men appear in the work, although men are present in the conversation of the women; indeed, the women show how their lives are boxed in by domineering men, absent men, unemployment, and poverty. Although the actresses are professionals, and probably middle-class, they imitate to perfection the women they portray. Each spent a year in the slums listening to the conversations of women, watching them gesture and walk, listening to their intonations. The actresses' mastery of their material as well as the power of the script have made the play a great success. It is on tour in Europe and Canada.

While many Chilean women have been transformed by the trials of the past decade—while many have an unprecedented sense of their power and competence—it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which their newly won independence is appreciated by their brothers. One male leader in the left underground, while acknowledging the efforts of the new women's organizations, almost guffawed at my suggestion that women may form the vanguard in the movement for Chile's emancipation. I suspect his attitude is not unusual. On the other hand, the remarkable suffering and the powers of endurance of contemporary Chilean women have undoubtedly profoundly penetrated the national consciousness. The wife and mother of the disappeared has become a new symbol around which the disaffected express their outrage and solidarity. In 1978, for instance, a "Human Rights Cantata" was performed in the Cathedral in Santiago. In its subject matter as well as in its utilization of folk instruments and rhythms, the Cantata is an authentic espression of the lives of the women of the pueblo. The text is from Genesis. Abel has been killed—he has disappeared—and God asks again and again, "Cain, where is thy brother?"

The text begins:

Oh, brown America
Such a lady and so humble

(8)

This music was born
pulsing in your roots
to say liberty
with a sad shame.

Oh, brown America
Song of gray days;
they have tortured your children;
I venerate your scars;
today I proclaim your rights
with guitars and flutes.

# ATTITUDES TOWARD GENDER IN TWO CULTURES: PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED STATES

Margaret Berrio, Maria Fernandez, Debbie Hinkle,
and Vicky Phillips, DePauw University

Humans may be easily classified into two categories on the basis of sex, a biological given. Decisions related to gender roles, the psychological attributes and behaviors associated with either sex, are not so easily made. Gender is a complex social schema which each individual constructs as she/he is exposed to gender stereotypes. In order to help illuminate the contribution of culture to the individual's ideas about gender, we chose to study the attitudes of college students in the United States and Puerto Rico, cultures which might be expected to display interesting similarities and differences.

A number of studies have dealt with attitudes toward women in the United States. Steinmann and Fox (1966) found that while American women considered themselves to be "moderately traditional" and independent, they felt that men's "ideal woman" would be less assertive. Although men reported that their "ideal woman" corresponded to the way the women actually saw themselves, men's answers became more traditional when questions were made more specific and personally relevant. The women in this study apparently had a clearer picture of men's ideal woman than the men themselves had.

Herman and Sedlacek (1973) developed a "Situational-Attitudes Toward Women" scale for men in which they asked questions about various hypothetical situations involving either a neutral person (no sex specified) or a woman. On 32 of the 100 items, men consistently stereotyped women, rendering them either less powerful or as sexual objects in the situations presented. Female police officers were seen as less threatening than male police officers, for example, and female doctors elicited arousal and embarrassment in the men.

Spence and Helmreich (1972) developed a scale to measure liberality of attitudes toward women and gathered data from both sexes in the U.S. In their college student sample, although men tended to reveal more traditional attitudes than women, there was considerable overlap.

These studies suggest three interesting aspects of United States college students' attitudes toward women:

1. Men view women more traditionally than women view women.
2. Men and women are ambiguous in their attitudes toward women.
3. Men are able to support a more liberal view of women when asked global rather than personally relevant questions.

Since Puerto Rico is not currently represented in the literature on attitudes toward women, we will present some of the scant findings from other Latin American countries. Although these countries share a language, a religion, and, to a certain degree, a cultural heritage, we are reluctant to claim any specific parallels between Puerto Rico and the diverse Latin American countries, especially because of Puerto Rico's close ties to the United States.

Pescatello (1976) gives an overview of the female role in Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico. She describes a social order which values the aggressive male and the passive female, an order supported by the Catholic Church and mandating the legal and social subordination of the woman. She describes this order as especially pronounced in rural areas.

Harkness (1973) reports that lower-class Latin American women who find it economically necessary to work outside the home show a marked despair. Working outside the home threatens both their own valued passivity as women and their husbands' valued role as provider.

Lomnitz and Lizaur (1979) used interview and observation to follow the urban upper-class descendents of one man in Mexico. They found that women's primary role in that family was that of "centralizer." Their duties were to instigate social and business gatherings on behalf of their husbands and to socialize daughters into the role of "good wife." They were viewed as socially and intellectually inferior to their husbands.

In the only cross-cultural study we were able to locate, Steinmann and Fox (1969) examined women's self-perceptions and their perceptions of men's "ideal woman" in New York, Buenos Aires, and Lima. The North American and Latin American women in this study agreed that men's "ideal woman" is submissive and willing to place the family, husband, and home above her own personal fulfillment. While Latin American women seemed willing to mold their behavior to this ideal, North American women saw themselves as more assertive and aggressive than this "ideal," and were more positive that a woman's career could be integrated with a good family life.

Based on these findings, we hypothesized that:

1. Puerto Rican college students would have more traditional scores on Spence and Helmreich's Attitudes Toward Women Scale. (AWS)
2. Within each culture, men would have more traditional scores on the AWS.
3. Responses to "specific" items on the AWS would be more traditional than responses to "global" items.
4. There would be gender-specific as well as cultural differences in the way men and women rank traits as desirable for men or women.

We administered the AWS to 148 unmarried students enrolled in Introductory Psychology courses in state-funded universities in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Muncie, Indiana. Since the AWS measures only attitudes toward women, we presented a list of eighteen generally desirable traits and had the students rank them according to desirability in women, before completing the AWS; and in men, after completing the AWS. Students ranked the traits in eighteen clusters of five to minimize response bias.

The AWS was modified by extending the range of alternative answers from four to six, and by changing half of the items from "global" to "personally relevant." (Questionnaires were translated into Spanish for the Puerto Rican

students.) Separate forms were developed for men and women. Examples of items from the modified AWS are:

> Female-specific: "You have the obligation to be faithful to your husband."
>
> Male-specific: "You and your wife should be partners in planning the family budget."
>
> Global: "Vocational and professional schools should admit the best qualified students independent of sex."

The raters indicated how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the statement.

**Table 1** presents each group's ranking of the eighteen characteristics in terms of their desirability for women and for men. To assess agreement within and between cultures, we calculated Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients on this data. Using this statistical tool, a value of +1 would indicate perfect agreement on rankings; a value of -1 would indicate opposite rankings; and a score of 0 would indicate that rankings were unrelated.

When we looked at agreement on the desirability of the characteristics for each gender, we found that Puerto Rican males and females showed strong agreement on what was desirable for men ($r=+96$, $p$ .01) and for women ($r= +91$, $p$ .01). North American students also agreed on desirable characteristics for men ($r= +.79$, $p$ .01), but not for women ($r= +23$, N.S.). In fact, we found consistent agreement across cultures and between sexes for male characteristics, but the only groups who agreed on characteristics desirable in women other than Puerto Rican males and females were Puerto Rican and American females ($r= +.56$, $p$ .05). There was actually a negative relationship between rankings of traits considered desirable in women by Puerto Rican males and by American females, but its statistical significance was marginal ($r= -.44$, $p$ .10).

To analyze further the data from rankings of the characteristics for men and women, we placed each characteristic rated by each group into one of five categories seen in **Table 2:**

> Highly Desirable and Gender Specific (for one gender only)
> Highly Desirable for Both Genders
> Moderately Desirable for Both Genders
> Less Desirable for Both Genders,
> Less Desirable and Gender Specific

It can be seen that there are similarities and differences in what is culturally desirable for both genders in the two cultures.

A striking observation from **Table 2** is that Puerto Rican students seem to view men and women not only as falling into two clear categories, but as opposites. For both male and female raters, characteristics seen as desirable in women are seen as undesirable in men, and vice versa. Thus, "ambitious,"

**TABLE 1**

PUERTO RICAN AND UNITED STATES STUDENTS' RANKINGS OF DESIRABILITY OF CHARACTERISTICS FOR FEMALES AND MALES

| | Puerto Rican Raters | | | | United States Raters | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female Raters | | Male Raters | | Female Raters | | Male Raters | |
| Characteristic | Rankings For Females | Rankings For Males | Rankings For Females | Rankings For Males | Rankings For Females | Rankings For Males | Rankings For Females | Rankings For Males |
| Honest | 1 | 15 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 12 |
| Ambitious | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 11 | 1 | 14 | 1 |
| Responsible | 2 | 11 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 7 |
| Forgiving | 13 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 15 | 5 | 17 |
| Courageous | 17 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 17 | 11 | 16 | 15 |
| Helpful | 4 | 14 | 6 | 14 | 15 | 10 | 9 | 14 |
| Broad-minded | 14 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Clean | 3 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 12 | 12 | 3 |
| Capable | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 9 |
| Self-controlled | 15 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 9 | 18 | 13 | 18 |
| Loving | 5 | 12 | 4 | 16 | 3 | 17 | 6 | 13 |
| Cheerful | 8 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 13 | 16 | 1 | 16 |
| Polite | 7 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 11 | 6 |
| Independent | 12 | 2 | 17 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 15 | 4 |
| Intellectual | 10 | 7 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 18 | 5 |
| Logical | 11 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 7 | 14 | 7 | 10 |
| Obedient | 9 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 18 | 7 | 17 | 8 |

"broad-minded," "independent," and "intellectual" are seen as highly desirable in men and less desirable in women, while "honest," "helpful," "loving," and "responsible" are valued highly in women and less in men. It must be cautioned that since all of the traits listed were positive, one should not equate "less desirable" with "undesirable," since all of the eighteen traits may have been considered to be desirable for both sexes by raters, who were making only relative judgments among them.

The pattern of defining men and women as opposite was not seen in the North American sample. However, male and female raters in the United States seemed to have opposite expectations for women. For example, whereas "cheerful," "broad-minded," and "forgiving" were deemed highly desirable in women by American males, the females ranked them as "less desirable" for themselves. American females rated "independence" as highly desirable for women, less desirable for men. In both the United States and Puerto Rico, "honest" and "loving" are seen by both sexes as desirable in women. Thus, while there is some agreement about desirability of characteristics for women in the American sample, there is also significant disagreement, not found in the Puerto Rican sample.

In general, American students did agree on characteristics appropriate for men. In fact, "ambitious" was at the top of all lists for men in both cultures. American women and men also agreed that "intellectual" and "obedient" are highly desirable characteristics in men, and that "logical," "forgiving," "cheerful," and "loving" are less desirable. There is an interesting discrepancy for "honest," which American females rate as "highly desirable" in men, but males rate as "less desirable" for themselves.

One puzzling finding was that, in the United States, "logical" was rated as a more desirable characteristic for women, and "obedient" was rated more desirable for men. This seems to contradict our cultural stereotype; but if students assumed that men were already very logical and women were very obedient, the ratings may reflect their sense that these characteristics should be moderated.

The data from the Attitudes Toward Women Scale were analyzed (ANOVA type SPF pr. q) and the student's culture ($F = 28.67$, $p$ .01), sex ($F = 16.23$, $p$ .01), and the type of question ("global" vs. "personally relevant") ($F = 41.84$, $p$ .01) were all found to contribute significantly to the variability in scores.

We were surprised to find that, although the "global, personally relevant" dimension was a significant one, the effect was opposite to our prediction. Males and females—and Americans and Puerto Ricans—all answered the "personally relevant" questions more liberally than the "global" ones. We are at a loss to explain this, since if students considered themselves to be more liberal than the average person, they would be expected to answer the global questions in a liberal way as well. This finding certainly would contradict the assertion that while, in the abstract, young people have accepted changing roles for women, in their personal lives, they find such changes more difficult to accommodate. It must be noted, however, that the students in this sample were all unmarried, so that many of the accommodations described in the vocational and marital obligations sections of the AWS might still have been rated by them in a hypothetical way.

**Table 2**

CHARACTERISTICS RANKED ACCORDING TO DESIRABILITY FOR WOMEN AND/OR MEN BY COLLEGE STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO

| | Puerto Rican Raters | | | | United States Raters | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female Raters | | Male Raters | | Female Raters | | Male Raters | |
| | Female Traits | Male Traits | Female Traits | Male Traits | Female Traits | Male Traits | Female Traits | Male Traits |
| Highly Desirable and Gender Specific | Honest<br>Responsible<br>Helpful<br>Loving | Ambitious<br>Broad-minded<br>Independent<br>Obedient<br>Intellectual | Honest<br>Responsible<br>Loving<br>Helpful | Ambitious<br>Independent<br>Broad-minded<br>Obedient<br>Intellectual | Honest<br>Independent<br>Loving<br>Clean | Ambitious<br>Broad-minded<br>Intellectual<br>Honest<br>Obedient | Cheerful<br>Broad-minded<br>Honest<br>Forgiving<br>Loving | Ambitious<br>Clean<br>Independent<br>Intellectual<br>Obedient |
| Highly Desirable for Both Genders | Capable<br>Clean<br>Cheerful | | | | Responsible | | | |
| Moderately Desirable for Both Genders | Polite<br>Logical | | | | Polite<br>Capable | | | |
| Less Desirable for Both Genders | Self-controlled<br>Forgiving<br>Imaginative<br>Courageous | | | | Self-controlled<br>Helpful<br>Imaginative<br>Courageous | | | |
| Less Desirable and Gender Specific | Ambitious<br>Independent<br>Logical<br>Intellectual<br>Broad-minded | Honest<br>Helpful<br>Loving<br>Responsible | Ambitious<br>Broad-minded<br>Independent<br>Logical<br>Intellectual | Loving<br>Helpful<br>Honest<br>Responsible | Cheerful<br>Broad-minded<br>Forgiving<br>Obedient<br>Ambitious | Clean<br>Logical<br>Forgiving<br>Cheerful<br>Loving | Ambitious<br>Independent<br>Obedient<br>Intellectual | Honest<br>Loving<br>Forgiving<br>Cheerful<br>Logical |

**FIGURE 1**

MEAN RESPONSES OF PUERTO RICAN AND UNITED STATES STUDENTS TO QUESTIONS IN THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF THE MODIFIED ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN SURVEY (SPENCE AND HELMRICH, 1972)




*Higher scores indicate more liberal attitudes toward women's roles.

(15)

It can be seen from **Figure 1**, which presents the average responses of the various groups to questions in the various categories of the AWS, that our other predictions were generally confirmed. In all categories of the AWS, except "Vocational, Educational, Intellectual," North Americans scored more liberally than Puerto Ricans, and females scored more liberally than males. Their mean total scores (of a possible 260) were: MPR, 131; FPR, 149; MA, 154; and FA, 171. While these differences are statistically significant and, we think, also practically significant, we caution against overstating the case for differences. In no case does the average difference between the highest and lowest groups exceed one category, indicating substantial agreement.

The students tended to agree on the categories of behavior for which they held the most liberal or traditional views, with the most traditional views expressed in the highly personal areas of sexual and dating behaviors. The more liberal views were expressed in the areas of general demeanor (drinking, swearing) and independence, while the most liberal views were expressed in the more legalistic areas of marital obligations and vocational-intellectual questions. Perhaps the more highly personal aspects of gender are less logical and more deeply ingrained in the personality. Change in these areas, more difficult to legislate, will occure more slowly.

Our study has demonstrated cultural differences in attitudes toward gender. Puerto Rican students were found to be more traditional than United States students in their attitudes toward women; and, within each culture, men were found to be more traditional than women. Students in both cultures agreed on the aspects of women's roles concerning which they held more liberal or traditional views. A striking finding was that while the men's role seemed clearly defined in both cultures—and Puerto Rican males and females tended to agree that a woman's role was opposite to a man's—there was considerable disagreement and ambiguity about the women's role in the United States. This fits well with our finding that American students were more liberal. Ambiguity in roles goes hand in hand with cultural change. While it may increase the difficulties for the person trying to establish a secure identity, it also provides a degree of flexibility which may ultimately result in greater individual satisfaction.

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# STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: THE USES OF MADNESS IN WOMEN'S FICTION

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In Kate Chopin's 1899 novel The Awakening, things happen very rapidly. Within the space of 100-plus pages, a young Creole wife grows dissatisfied with her claustrophobic existence; sees through not only her marriage but the institution in general to a bleak vision of the buying and selling of women kept naive and incapable; decides to commit herself to art; has a couple of affairs; moves out of her house; and commits suicide. Given this pace, it is not surprising that the people in Edna Pontellier's life react swiftly to her metamorphoses. But I am still taken aback every time I read the scene, about half-way through the novel, where Edna's husband Leonce confronts her with the disgrace of her days spent in her studio, painting, while the wives of his business associates come and go, leaving cards. He asks her why she can't be like her friend Adele, who dabbles at the piano but "doesn't let everything else go to chaos."[1] Edna tells him to go away, that she cannot explain what keeps her in the studio. Here is Leonce's response: "It sometimes entered Mr. Pontellier's mind to wonder if his wife were not growing a little unbalanced mentally. He could see plainly that she was not herself."[2]

Leonce draws two interesting conclusions from his wife's deviance. The first is that she is mentally unbalanced. His response is to consult the family doctor, to whom he confides his second conclusion: "She's got some sort of notion in her head concerning the eternal rights of women; and—you understand—we meet in the morning at the breakfast table."[3] The implications of this analysis are fascinating. First, Edna has said nothing about women's rights, eternal or otherwise; this is Leonce's deduction, which he, interestingly, associates with madness. Another implication is that the Pontellier sex life is not, to his mind, all that it should be; in other words, the "rights of women" take over when the conjugal "rights of men" are forgotten. The upshot is a diagnosis of mental unbalance.

The doctor is remarkably generous to Edna, though he tells Leonce that women are strange creatures and shouldn't be mishandled. In any case, he does not want immediately to incarcerate her. She, for her part, is ambivalent about her own mental state. She is a woman to whom things are happening rapidly but who has minimal understanding of the changes occurring within her.

My frustration with the novel is that Edna never fully awakens to her own transformation. She has said she has been asleep all her life and she is still awakening as she swims to her death. Consequently, she cannot affirm her deviance, except sporadically and somewhat childishly. Nevertheless, she is aware enough to know that the course she is taking leads to that dangerous territory that society will call madness. She speaks to her friend Mademoiselle Reisz, the serious pianist, of moving out of her house and

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1. Kate Chopin, The Awakening (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 57.
2. Chopin, p. 57.
3. Chopin, p. 65.

anticipating "the feeling of freedom and independence." "What does your husband say?" asks Mademoiselle. "I have not told him yet," Edna responds. "He will think I am demented no doubt. Perhaps you think so."[4] Again the penalty for deviance--specifically, for female self-assertion, for the act of defining oneself as singular in the world--is the charge of madness.

Mademoiselle Reisz, however, responds by shaking her head and asking Edna's reason for her prospective move. This in itself is remarkable: the assumptions that a woman would act from good reasons, and especially that such a deviant act could HAVE a reason at all. It is appropriate that Mlle. Reisz is the one to confront Edna's "irrationality" as if it were sanity, for she is the other character accused of madness. Her role is a kind of fusion of witch and bag lady: She does not wear the right clothes and she is rude at dinner; beyond all this, she is an artist--not a woman who draws or a lady who plays piano, but an artist. The reaction to her is predictable: "I've heard she's partially demented," remarks Edna's lover, the lounge lizard Alcee Arobin. "She seems to me wonderfully sane,"[5] Edna replies, coming perhaps as close as ever to affirming her own mental health by affirming her mentor's. Edna's sanity was first questioned in discussions of the proper role of art in a lady's life. After all, for a woman to define herself as an artist is to appropriate her creative power to herself, to define it in itself and not through others, to commit herself to her own vision.

The Awakening illustrates the long tradition by which women bear, symbolically, the "irrational" elements in their culture. Additionally, madness, an entirely relative term, is the label a society always reserves for extreme deviance, and the more restrictive the socially assigned role, the wider the range of human behavior defined as deviant. The idea of madness as the true sanity in an insane world, central to R.D. Laing's psychology, has been borrowed by Barbara Rigney as the crucial concept in her book on madness in women's fiction.[6] In the context of women's experience, Laing's approach attains a new significance, and women's madness in literature can be seen as an indictment of a culture in which women are set up as symbols of what is most hated and feared, in other words, set up for madness, playing the necessary scapegoat role as village idiot, just as Mlle. Reisz does for the Creole community of New Orleans.

In life and in literature, as we see in The Awakening, women are the victims of a male-defined concept of madness. The concept covers deviance from the assigned female role, not only in behavior but in feeling: Edna ceases to demonstrate the requisite feeling for Leonce and the kids. It is particularly her feeling for the children that is under scrutiny by the narrator, by Edna's family and friends, by Edna herself. The "sane" female feelings are those focussed upon others, and proper others at that. The "insane" feelings emerge from and for oneself. The artist figure in the novel, the projection of what Edna would like to be, is viewed by others as a crank, a crazy lady.

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4. Chopin, p. 79.
5. Chopin, p. 83.
6. Barbara Rigney, Madness and Sexual Politics in the Feminist Novel (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

In Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper," the narrator similarly struggles under the dictum that female artistic expression verges upon insanity. In this case, the husband who makes the rules is a doctor, coming at the narrator with the full force of his society's definition of health. We know that he is a composite of Gilman's own husband and her doctor, who treated female depression by depriving patients of the very tools an enlightened modern psychologist would use to combat it: pen and paper. One wonders: Was it the overtaxing of the poor, feeble female brain that Gilman's doctor and his brethren really feared, or was it the truths and visions of themselves their pens might release?

Gilman's narrator makes a fascinating response to her physical and mental incarceration: She chooses the madness that is being forced upon her, claiming it as her own and appropriating it to her own uses, producing a peculiarly female vision. She sees her own predicament clearly for the first time as she watches the woman crawling around behind the pattern on the wallpaper; and further, she sees it as the predicament of Woman. In the end, as I interpret the tale, the narrator finds a release and ultimately a triumph in her madness. The tension disappears from her voice; she is elated; she is expansive; she laughs at her husband's consternation; and the final image of the book has her crawling OVER the body of her husband, who has fainted at the sight of the monster he has created in his infinite medical wisdom.

Is this the escape route that Bertha Mason Rochester in Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre chose, too? This most famous silent character in literature is also trapped by a male definition of madness, but we see her gradually usurping it, reappropriating it, escaping into it from a situation identical to that of the narrator of "The Yellow Wallpaper": the locked room, the benevolent-tyrant husband. The narrator's room, with its disturbing wallpaper and its nailed-down bed, becomes a metaphor for the maddening confinement of woman's situation, but that metaphor is finally overturned by the force of the narrator's madness. So might Bertha's attic room be seen as a double-edged metaphor: It is the restrictive, dehumanizing role to which she was born—rich merchant's daughter, young aristocrat's bartered bride, marketable commodity, brood mare, pawn in patriarchal socio-economic maneuverings. But it is also Bertha's territory, a room of her own claimed in revenge against that very role, her retreat into the power of her own anger, from which she makes strategic nocturnal forays. Necessity becomes strength; confinement becomes liberty. How many women's lives have operated on this paradox? The location of Bertha's room seems to establish it as a place of fearful liberty: It is on the third floor of Thornfield, an almost mystical place to which Jane goes to release her own impossibly pent-up imagination and desire. In the passage rendered famous by Virginia Woolf's displeasure, Jane's musings on the question of female freedom are juxtaposed most tellingly with Bertha's mirthless laughter.

Bertha's madness is, of course, not only her own escape but Jane's. In her function as alter-ego Bertha represents much of Jane's psyche (and Rochester's as well); she enacts both Jane's confinement—sexual, economic, emotional—and her release. Her midnight sojourns are Jane's dreams; her attacks upon Rochester, of course, the impulses buried most deeply beneath Jane's intense love for him; her animal sexuality and pure rage, the exact inverse of Jane's puritan self-control, its complement more than its negation.

Feminist critics—myself included—are sorely tempted to see Bertha's madness as entirely Rochester's creation; his own account of his betrothal and marriage offers so many rich possibilities! But if we play by the rules, we must give credence to his account of hereditary madness in the Masons. HOWEVER: We can at least wonder—I always do—what Bertha was like fifteen years ago when that attic door first clanked shut behind her. And heredity aside, we can see how Rochester's own definitions operate in Bertha's oppression. One example will suffice: In an account of his past, replete with acknowledgement of his own sexual appetites, he sees no irony in associating Bertha's madness with her "giant propensities,"[7] as he euphemistically calls them. Jane Eyre is especially interesting in its examination of a woman's madness from both a male and a female point of view: Rochester's articulated version, and the latent one running beneath Jane's narration, eloquent in her silences.

Bertha and "The Yellow Wallpaper" narrator are examples of women who, having "madness" or illness imposed upon them by male authorities, turn the tables, laying claim to madness as their only liberty. Doris Lessing's women are also prone to this madness-as-escape—usually from the constrictions of modern suburban domestic perfection. In "To Room 19," the perfect wifemother one day sees a nattily dressed somebody, probably an urbane Satan, in her garden and begins seeking out a sleazy hotel room near Victoria Station--a peculiar twist on "A Room of One's Own"—until she ultimately realizes that there is no room far enough away from the suction of her family—except in death.

The other form taken by women's madness in fiction is what I call the "Nature Woman" variety. In this model, the heroine escapes or subverts or explodes her "civilized" female identity as a means of cleansing herself, of freeing herself from a society where women's oppression is at the heart of a larger corruption. Madness is still escape, but the use of nature—a particularly female resource in literature—is the source of self-redefinition. I am reminded of that phase of the ancient quest where the hero did his required mad number, usually withdrawing into the wilderness, shedding clothes, getting hairy, and living as an animal, purging himself and gaining strength. Jane Eyre, in fact, undergoes this sort of trial after she leaves Thornfield and wanders, destitute, wholly at the mercy of the nature she calls Mother. This is the last extremity to which she must go before her fulfillment can come. It serves as a kind of mad scene in Jane's quest, wherein she reaches the bottom line, the bare bones of her hungry selfhood, which is reconstructed from that nadir.

Margaret Atwood's Surfacing makes similar connections. The unnamed narrator, the Everywoman of this novel, strikes us at first as suffering from some psychosis; it becomes clear that her dissociation, her numbness, her paranoia, her delicate relationship with a problematic past are all functions of what she calls "Americanism"—the creeping rot of civilization as a male fantasy turned nightmare, where the relationship between Man and Nature duplicates that between Man and Woman: dominance-submission, continual rape. Gradually it emerges that the narrator's femaleness is at the heart of the difficulty: in her past, lying dormant under layers of fabrication in

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7. Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre (New York: Norton, 1971), p. 269.

an exploitive sexual liaison with an art professor and a victimizing abortion from which she feels herself to have been completely alienated, without choice or power. Likewise, this very femaleness, her point of contact with nature, will be the source of her regeneration, but the process is not easy. First she must revive the memory of her victimization, of the deathfulness of her life, in the context of the death wish of humanity itself, symbolized by a crucified blue heron. But she finds that she must go further: When her lover and friends leave her alone at her family's cabin in the Canadian Wilderness, she turns the mirror to the wall, locks herself out of the cabin, and reverts to nature—first as a protohuman, then as an animal, then a tree, and finally: "I am a place."[8] She abandons humanity and womanhood to reconstruct them from the bottom up, beginning with a few days of pure sensation and instinct, listening to the voices inside and around her in order to know how to live. She relinquishes the "sanity" represented by her father, whom she has ostensibly come to seek, but whose scientific "detachment" she finally comes to see as lurking at the heart of the real madness, a civilization bent on destruction. At first she jumps to the conclusion that her father has gone mad and run off into the forest—a fantasy representing, I think, her own wishes for her father and for herself.

Ultimately she chooses the madness for herself: "From any rational point of view," she says, "I am absurd; but there are no longer any rational points of view."[9] Having claimed madness, she achieves a vision not of her lamented daddy, but of her underplayed mother, a witch-woman who tames birds and frightens bears. Her true sanity comes from the "irrational" female source in her neglected past.

When she slowly returns to the surface, tentatively reapproaching civilization, she looks into the mirror in the cabin and sees the wild thing she has become: "A new centerfold,"[10] she observes. She has explored the second type of madness: not deviant but uncivilized. In her own particularly female exploitation she has seen the victimization of nature itself, including and subsuming the human. With her reinvented humanness she testily heads back toward the world of men and women, pregnant with a fetus that atones for the first and symbolizes her own rebirth and new commitment to life, and accompanied by the lover whose grizzly-bear tendencies turn out to be his saving graces because they are pre-human. Surfacing is perhaps the clearest example of a novel in which a woman opts for madness as a radically new and essentially female sanity with which to combat the madness of patriarchal rationalism.

Similarly broad connections are made by Kate Brown, heroine of Doris Lessing's The Summer Before the Dark. Kate is another of Lessing's beautiful, well-dressed, intelligent, Perfect Suburban Women, trapped helplessly in perfectly sterile marriages, lost in the roles of mother and wife. In her summer vacation from her customary identity, she confronts something like the madness Atwood affirms in Surfacing, and within it sees the relation between her own conflict and human reality. There is no wilderness handy here in downtown London, so Kate resorts to another time-honored literary

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8. Margaret Atwood, Surfacing (New York: Popular Library, 1972), p. 213.
9. Atwood, p. 199.
10. Atwood, p. 222.

equivalent for removal from reality, mental imbalance and realignment, spiritual change: she gets very sick. She loses a lot of weight, forgets about make-up, and lets her grey roots grow in. The result is—a new kind of centerfold, as she looks into the mirror. For the Surfacing narrator this centerfold was nature's healthy, female response to civilization's lunacy. For Kate, this image is the haggard but natural reality behind the shifting roles that have comprised her life and alienated her from herself. She scrapes herself together and goes to the theatre, where she plays out the madwoman role, shouting at the players from her seat, disrupting the performance, talking to herself. Lessing objectifies Kate in this scene, referring to her as "a woman," as she does throughout the book to emphasize Kate's dislocation from herself, as well as her representational function. Looking about her, Kate sees that everyone in the audience has turned to dogs, cats, wolves, foxes, dressed up as people, feigning civilization, playing the same roles she has played. She herself, glancing into a mirror, has turned into a monkey. The state of nature besets a London theater. Yet it is not Atwood's creative, healthy nature; this too is a perversion, a sea of masks, and one day, when these animal masks dissolve—"Then the Lion would lie down with the Lamb, no doubt . . . ."[11]

Madness, for Kate, is a return to nature in order to see civilization clearly for what it is and see her own predicament in a wider context before climbing slowly back toward human life. In the latter section of the book, while Kate boards at the flat of a strange young woman, she alternates her mad and sane identities, her sophisticated, pretty self and her crazy-lady self, experimenting with the reactions of people on the street, waiters, storekeepers. Ultimately she returns to suburbia, taking with her her greying hair—sign of the internalization of the crazy lady she has discovered on her summer vacation.

Kate's mad self has an objective correllative, to borrow Eliot's phrase, in her friend Mary Finchley, who generally appears only as a thought in Kate's mind, an important point of reference as Kate examines herself and her culture over the summer. Mary combines both types of madness I have discussed. She is Nature Woman, braless and without make-up; she is also the deviant, who simply does not conform to any particular role or anyone's needs but her own. In this respect she is Kate's opposite, living across the street and enacting Kate's fantasy of total irresponsibility, complete refusal of obligation to others. Mary is a lousy wife and a terrible mother and has slept with Kate's husband, but she is great company. She lives for two things: sex and laughter, both central to the crazy lady, as we saw back at Thornfield. She is not rebellious against the constraints of civilized femininity; she simply doesn't understand or respond to any morality at all. She is completely amoral and therefore totally free. She is an experiment, a what-if; thus it is that she lives mostly in Kate's mind. She and Kate have what they call "cow sessions," orgies of femaleness understood only by women, wherein the two of them drink themselves silly and exhaust themselves laughing at words like "husband." Mary is a satire of Kate's existence; her craziness is Kate's escape valve before she leaves home, allowing her to explode the conventions of correct female life.

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11. Doris Lessing, The Summer Before the Dark (New York: Bantam, 1974), p. 158.

A pattern has emerged from all this, one that I discovered while teaching women's fiction: the recurring device of the mad double, who enacts the heroine's chaotic, irrational, sexual, socially destructive impulses. Mary Finchley is to Kate as Bertha is to Jane and as Mlle. Reisz is to Edna Pontellier; and remember that the narrator of "The Yellow Wallpaper" creates her own double in the woman crawling through the interstices of the wallpaper pattern. I think that it is partially for this reason that mirrors play such an important role in women's fiction, as my students were fascinated to discover this past summer. The mirror, that focus of femininity, that symbol of so-called female narcissism, is appropriated by the female writer as a device for self-exploration. Jane first sees Bertha as a reflection in her mirror, dressed in her wedding veil. Earlier in her life she faints upon seeing an apparition in a mirror, while she is incarcerated in the Red Room as a rebellious child, a scene in which she is, in fact, playing Bertha. Kate Brown's reflection continually offers crucial documentation of the progress of her quest, appropriate to a novel about masks. The Surfacing narrator turns a mirror to the wall in order to become subject rather than object, to discover herself from within. In doing so she rejects the femininity represented by her "best friend" Anna, locked into the mirror, never without make-up, who functions, perhaps, as a projection of the narrator's image of herself at her most civilized, least human extreme.

The reasons for women writers' use of the mad double as a mirror for the narrator are too complex to explore neatly in this context. Fundamentally it probably represents another manifestation of female self-alienation: The dangerous, attractive impulses are split off because they cannot be safely, comfortably owned. This is doubtless true of many male writers as well--I think of Dickens' constant habit of projecting his hero's frightening tendencies onto another character, sidekick or villain. But the context of female psychology and experience gives the technique a distinct character, for the fantasy of a powerful, angry, defiant, outrageous self has different sources and implications for a woman than for a man.

One role played by the mad double in women's literature is to represent the connections with other women that are vital to the alienated woman's survival. Edna feels a bond with Mlle. Reisz that represents her tie to her dead mother, and her new tie to her own potential. The narrator in "The Yellow Wallpaper" first generates a double of herself and then watches it multiply, first behind the wallpaper and then outside the window, creating a vision of a world of creeping women in which her own situation acquires meaning. As many critics have explained, Jane Eyre and Bertha Rochester have a rich interrelationship. Contrary to Rochester's constant depiction of "his" two women as polar opposites, rivals for his destiny, they support and protect each other in various ways. Bertha tries to warn Jane with the torn veil before the abortive wedding; and she never even attempts to harm Jane, saving her violence for the two men with whom she comes into contact. In their final confrontation before her flight from Thornfield, Jane, in turn, quietly defends Bertha's humanity in the fact of Rochester's vituperation. She understands her rights as he cannot and, in fact, actively imagines herself as Bertha, and as one of his other cast-off mistresses, alligning with all the "bad women" against whom he wishes to define her. And to Kate Brown, Mary Finchley represents an alternate reality, a female reality, where her spirit expands and relaxes. Her relationship with Mary has an authenticity wholly different from anything in her dealings with her husband and children.

So it appears that the woman writer alienates the "craziness" of her heroine in a double, but then recalls it, as it were, through the bonding between the two.

This archetype of the mad double, if I am right that it is an archetype in women's fiction, may even be considered a response to the traditional dualism of female characters in male fiction: the virgin and the whore, the fair heroine and the dark lady. In female hands, the "bad" woman, the heroine's shadow, is redefined into someone much more complex. In Jane Eyre this transformation is enacted before the reader's eyes, as Jane forces Rochester to revise his original version of Bertha and indeed of Jane herself, the "demon" and "angel" in his life, to use his very words.

I would suggest further that, in place of the virgin-whore dichotomy, the woman writer often offers a pairing that represents truer female self-projections: the mad self and the child-self, radical experience and radical innocence. Often both represent elements of the heroine's past, as in Jane Eyre, where the infant with which Jane is "burdened" in her recurring dream represents her eternal orphanhood, her need and deprivation, as Bertha is the repressed rage of that past. Adele Varens, Rochester's "ward," is yet another image, more distorted, of the child-Jane. The Summer Before the Dark has a startling parallel in Kate's sequential dream of the seal, an image of her own vulnerability and of that in herself which has not been nourished. Kate's mental equilibrium is sustained, and her survival ensured, by the balance struck between the seal and Mary Finchley within her mind. In The Awakening, an image of herself as a child wading through the sea of tall grass at her Tennessee home recalls to Edna the same sense of her potential that she sees in Mlle. Reisz. And in Surfacing, the child-self is the lost fetus, doubly lost in the narrator's refusal to acknowledge it. When this child-self—representing lost integrity, life force, and also terrific creative potential—is reclaimed, internalized, resuscitated, the madwoman is also released, and the two collaborate in the heroine's salvation.

The two archetypes serve this function in each of the novels I have discussed. Their importance in female psychology I will only tentatively attempt to explain. It seems to me that the madwoman is everything male culture dictates that a woman shall not be: angry, sexual, strong, funny, violent, indifferent to the social norms that historically figure so powerfully in women's lives. She is that upsurgence of Mother Nature—destructive and potent as well as nurturant—frightening to the male psyche that has lost touch with her. And her inverse is the child, representing both the vulnerability women fear and the past authenticity and integrity they so often feel they have lost to a world which alienates them from themselves at every turn. The pattern of regeneration in female fiction may well be the reintegration of those aspects of the self. As usual, I will use Jane Eyre as the paradigm, regarding it as I do as a sort of Ur-women's novel: Having acknowledged fully, once and for all, her cosmic orphanhood as she lay on the ground outside Marsh End, utterly destitute and vulnerable, and having faced her own rage and passion in Bertha Mason on her aborted wedding day, Jane can respond, when Rochester asks her upon her return if she is quite human, "I conscientiously believe so, sir." In the other novels as well, the quest has been for full humanity—a perilous journey for womankind, and one in which perhaps our craziness is our best help. Let me finish the passage from The Awakening with which I began:

It sometimes entered Mr. Pontellier's mind to wonder if his wife were not growing a little unbalanced mentally. He could see plainly that she was not herself. That is, he could not see that she was becoming herself and daily casting aside that fictitious self which we assume like a garment with which to appear before the world.[12]

12. Chopin, p. 57.

## FEMINIST COUNSELING

Anna DiStefano, Washington University

An artificial distinction is often made between the goals of counseling and the goals of psychotherapy. Counseling is said to promote human development; thus, it helps people through the "normal" crises in their lives, e.g., adolescent identity formation or the mid-life crisis. Psychotherapy, on the other hand, is thought to deal with more severe emotional problems which require a kind of intervention akin to "repair." Thus, a middle-aged woman who becomes severely depressed after her children "leave the nest" may be referred for psychotherapy. Differences between counseling and therapy may well exist in theory, but in practice, it is usually impossible to distinguish one from the other (Ivey, 1980). Knowledge of the nature of the problem or its degree of severity is not practically useful in determining which is desirable: counseling or therapy.

From a feminist prespective, it is even less possible to make this distinction. "Normal" development has been investigated and described in terms of white, male experience (Gilligan, 1979). Is a woman abnormal and, therefore, in need of therapy if she does not progress through Erik Erikson's life stages or William Perry's states of ethical development? Should a woman's life be viewed within these frameworks at all? For the feminist counselor, the answer is no, albeit a qualified no.

Feminist scholarship and personal experience have shown that women and men live in different worlds (Bernard, 1981); yet traditional psychological theories are based on male assumptions and generalize from men's experience. None of them takes into account the significant difference in the ways in which women—and persons of different races and classes—experience and think about the world.

Feminism has helped counselors and therapists see how existing psychological theories both omit and distort women's experience, making women appear to be deviant. Thus, the feminist counselor sees these theories not only as incomplete but also as misrepresentations of women's reality.

Is feminist counseling therefore a-theoretical? No. Rather, the feminist counselor is engaged in the process of formulating new theory. An equal partner in this formulation is the client.

The empowerment of the client is critical to feminist counseling in at least two ways: First, rather than using traditional psychological theory to judge the appropriateness of the counselor's work, feminist counseling uses the client's assessment as the final arbiter of adequacy of understanding. Second, the counseling methods or "tools" themselves are shared with the client. Power is thereby shared, making it easier for the client eventually to phase out any need for the counselor.

In our society, this kind of empowerment is most needed by those clients who have had minimal or no access to privilege, e.g., women, people of color, the poor, lesbians, and gay men. It is least needed by privileged, white men. Although they certainly have been damaged through their role of privilege in a system that oppresses everyone else, white men probably

require some form of counseling yet to be adequately defined. In any case, the feminist counselor would do well to refer to someone else, if possible, any client whose experience has been so different from hers that empathy appears to her to be extremely unlikely.

Self-awareness is also involved in the decision to refer the client to another counselor. The world view of each counselor allows that person to see some things more clearly than others. Race, class, and family background are included among the critical components of world view. In other words, who the counselor is (as well as who the client is) may aid or impede counselor effectiveness. For example, different counselors may be needed for a working-class white woman and for an upper-class black male.

To sum up to this point, the feminist counselor finds it difficult to label clients as severely abnormal, given the racism, sexism, and classism which pervade our society and its ways of understanding reality. She seeks to empower clients through self-validation and shared exploration. She recognizes that her particular point of view makes it easier to understand the experiences of people who have life histories, circumstances, and events similar to her own.

Regardless of theoretical orientation, the counselor hopes to see clients develop new responses to old problems and, toward that end, she customarily uses the following procedures (Ivey, 1980), in whole or in part:

1. The client explains her problem and she and the counselor examine it together until they share a common understanding of the full nature of the problem.
2. Together, they generate and evaluate alternative approaches to working on the problem.
3. The client makes a decision to act.

How the problem is stated and understood is the foundation for all that follows. If it is defined prematurely and imprecisely, the possible alternative strategies for change will seem to miss the mark; or, if a solution is attempted, it may fail. It is essential that the counselor and client explore the problem in depth. Nevertheless, they may still define it incorrectly; as long as this error serves as the basis for re-evaluation (as opposed to excuse-making), nothing has been lost, except time.

Furthermore, the feminist counselor must always keep the political context of the client's situation in mind. The following example (Cowan, Egan, & Hetland, 1979) illustrates this point:

> I'm a 35-year old professor. I've been active in the woman's movement for a number of years. I want to eliminate the inequities in our society, but at times I feel discouraged. I don't think there are enough people out there who really care anymore (p. 89).

Is this woman's problem time-mangement? Poor social skills? Depression? Perhaps. In addition, however, this professor grew to maturity at a time when a woman's sense of her self-worth was based on sacrifice; she currently lives in a country which refuses to affirm, constitutionally, equal rights of

women, and in which most efforts at service or reform are under-funded or destroyed. It will be important for the feminist counselor to see and intervene where the client has some degree of choice; it will also be important for the feminist counselor to support this woman's construction of reality, her perception that the process of social change can be a debilitating and lonely one. In other words, not only must the client's social environment be acknowledged by the feminist counselor, but its oppressive features must be explicated.

The second part of Ivey's model calls for sorting out options. In doing so, the counselor must recognize the power inherent in her educational and clinical training and must seek to use that training to explain options to the client—not to make decisions for her. Once the client chooses an option, the counselor's goal is client action (Ivey's phase 3) which is not limited to adjustment. That is, the client may need help in altering the environment itself, as well as her responses to it. Another example from Cowan, et al., may be helpful:

> I'm thirty-nine years old. I'm a mother of three teenagers. My husband and I were recently divorced, and I'm wondering how to start a career after 18 years at home raising the kids. I majored in education, but I married right after graduation and never taught school (p. 85).

The feminist counselor may feel strongly that this client needs to develop a support network and additional skills through a displaced homemaker's program, or that assertiveness training would help the client in a job search, or that dream analysis would help the client understand why she feels as she does. Rather than subtle coercion toward any of these options, however, it is the feminist counselor's task to explore with the client the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative. Once a strategy has been selected, counselor and client work as a team to change the problematic situation.

Throughout the entire process, the most critical skill for the counselor is empathy: the ability to see the situation as if she were the client. Traditionally, its component parts are: positive regard and warmth; concreteness, immediacy, genuineness; and confrontation (Rogers, 1942). The notion that an effective counselor must develop these skills is not, of course, exclusive to feminist counseling. What difference, then, does a feminist perspective make?

Positive regard means respecting clients—finding the positive thread in their actions. The feminist counselor who considers her "consciousness highly raised" may be condescending or unsympathetic to the needs and desires of the "politically incorrect" client. Of what use is feminism's "raised consciousness" if it creates divisions among women, rather than serves to bridge differences? Warm communication of respect and caring has long been a feminine virtue which should not be abandoned within feminism.

For example, the lesbian mother of three children and the heterosexual wife of a business executive must both be respected for the choices they have made. Moreover, no matter which woman is counseling the other, it is important that they learn to talk with each other in ways that are caring as well as challenging, and accepting as well as demanding.

Issues need to be approached with concreteness and specificity rather than abstraction and overgeneralization. Most women (feminist or otherwise!) are particularly adept at seeing things contextually and in relation to each other (Gilligan, 1977). Using the immediate context of the counselor-client relationship is therefore appropriate and productive. It is especially effective when the counselor participates genuinely in the interaction. For example, if a client is struggling with the issue of dependence in intimate relationships, she and her counselor might choose to examine their relationship to search out similarities and differences with other relationships. Such an activity would also require on-going self-examination on the counselor's part, for her authenticity in such an encounter would depend on her willingness to confront and work on such issues in relation to herself. Her needs, however, should not take precedence over the client's. To this end, an effective counselor arranges for some form of supervision of her work with clients: She may meet weekly with her agency supervisor, or she may contract independently with another professional. In either case, the feminist counselor presents her work and asks that her performance be evaluated; such monitoring is useful in sorting out client issues from counselor preoccupations.

The most difficult subskill of empathy is confrontation. In part, that is because confrontation tends often to be confused with anger. In confrontation, the counselor points out discrepancies in client behavior or between client verbalization and behavior. These discrepancies may provoke frustration or anger in the counselor, but effectively confronting a client is a skill, not an emotion. It is true that one of the important uses of this skill is in dealing with anger. Feelings of anger are often hard for women in our society (counselors or clients) to acknowledge and work through. Women must learn confrontative skills so that conflicts can be faced and resolved.

For example, the adolescent client who says she wants to avoid pregnancy but who continues to have unprotected intercourse will eventually need to be confronted about the discrepancy between her goals and her behavior. At the same time, her risk-taking may provoke anger in the caring, feminist counselor. Nevertheless, confronting the client should be separated from becoming angry with her. Confrontation serves the client's needs; expression of anger, the counselor's. At the same time, counselors may find it necessary and helpful to share their anger with clients—as long as "ownership" of the feeling is acknowledged as the counselor's.

Since feminist counseling has many similarities with other kinds of counseling and psychotherapy, many characterize it as "simply (sic) what every good counselor does." Indeed, feminist counseling does overlap in interesting and important ways with other therapeutic approaches. It is distinguished, nevertheless, in these ways from other approaches: its emphasis on the client's experience and its corresponding critique of existing psychological theories; its commitment to shared authority; its awareness and valuing of diversity; and its twin goals of empowerment and social change. Feminist counseling owes a great deal to the political aspects of feminism, and the feminist counselor seeks to repay that debt in each encounter with a client.

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# A DIALOGUE*
# CRITICAL ISSUES IN WOMEN'S STUDIES: RACE, CLASS, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Eva Hooker, C.S.C., Saint Mary's College, and
Anna DiStefano, Washington University

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** A good question to begin with is, "Why are the issues of race, class, and sexual orientation important, not only for this conference and the GLCA colleges, but for all institutions of higher learning to confront?"

**EVA HOOKER:** I think it is because of the nature of the institutions in which we work. First of all, colleges are committed to something I'll simply call the collegial life, which means that we live together, we think together, we share ideas together, we share ourselves. I don't think we can share all of ourselves in a collegial way if we're leaving out how we feel about ourselves as white women or black women or Hispanic women or Chinese women or heterosexual women or lesbian women or women of certain classes. Second, we teach the liberal arts, and we say the purpose of that is to know yourself. Historically, knowing the self has always meant the white male self. In my education at a women's college, that is what it was. Larnegan has set up a way of trying to break out of that philosophical method—by experiencing systematically that which is other. I think that's a second piece of liberal learning: to experience within the self that which is other. That is one reason why it is really important for me to break out of the kind of education I received, and help my students break out of the education which they are already set to receive within the perimeters of Saint Mary's College.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** For me, the concrete translation of what you have been talking about is that the curriculum is incomplete: It simply doesn't reflect vast amounts of human experience; it doesn't emphasize experience that hasn't been white and male. Research has looked at white male experience as normative. I know that to be true in social science research. If you look at the mission of the university the way they state it, they are lying to their students; we are lying to our students, because we don't tell them the whole truth. We commit the sin of omission as well as commission.

The methods are also incomplete. We use a style of discussion in which we talk around issues. We don't talk about personal experience. We set up roles that distance people from each other. We ask people to talk in abstractions. These methods have class biases, if not other biases as well. The curriculum itself is incomplete; the academic community itself is not representative of much of the world. It doesn't even prepare us for the life of the mind. We deny ourselves access to much more than half of human thinking and experience and we all lose something by it. White, privileged males lose a part of their humanity by not confronting the issues. It is not only in the interest of those who are excluded, but of those who are currently included in the institution to confront these issues.

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*The Dialogue was recorded, transcribed, and edited for publication.

**EVA HOOKER:** How are these three huge issues—race, class, and sexual preference—the same, and how are they different from each other?

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** They all set up a dichotomy between you and others who are perceived as different from you. You project fear of things inside you to groups you see that are different from you. Therefore, you give yourself permission not to deal with those things that you are afraid of in yourself. For example, much of my racism comes from my fear of my own anger, frustration, and vulnerability about having a working-class background and being a woman; and much of what I'm afraid of in myself—the anger that could turn to violence, the inadequacy, the insecurity—I tend to project onto other people, those whom I see as different from myself. Heterosexuals often do the same with the issue of lesbianism or gay sexuality; and probably upper-class people do the same thing with issues related to working-class people. Similarities exist. The differences are that some of those issues cut horizontally, and some cut both horizontally and vertically. Race is also an issue of class because of the different economic classes within particular racial groups; class is a racial issue because of the different experiences of class, depending upon ethnic group and racial group; and sexual orientation cuts across both of those. So the question arises, "Where is my first allegiance? Am I first a working-class woman, or a black woman, or a lesbian? Which is my primary identity?"

**EVA HOOKER:** I see all three things as being about identity, about ways of describing who I am, and ways in which I am not consciously called to make any statements, to make any statements out loud. Very rarely do I have to make any statements about what class or race I belong to. The pretense of the white, middle-class familial structure in which I was brought up hid very carefully the great family secret of my Latin American ancestry, Indian ancestry, black ancestry, which I have had very great difficulty finding out about. Always there is a shadow—something secretive, something mysterious, something unknown, something kept away and glossed over very beautifully with, "Well, you know, my dear, you must learn these manners and speak English grammatically, and Spanish is the last language that you will learn and . . . ."

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** What struck me when you were talking is that the individual is forced to react when the external society exerts the most pressure, when it won't let you forget which of those groups you belong to. For instance, as a university student, I could try to forget that I was working class. It meant trying to learn a way of dressing, a way of talking, and trying not to talk about certain things. It meant making sure people didn't come home with me at vacations.

The first reaction is to hide. Society has said that you will not advance because you do not have these particular qualities, or you do not have this particular breeding, or you do not know how to talk this particular way, or you insist on talking in that other particular way. As you become more aware, you cannot hide. You have to assert your difference.

**EVA HOOKER:** You have to learn a vocabulary, a language with which to assert yourself. You have to learn the sentences, and you have to practice saying the sentences somewhere.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** I strongly agree. Yet I have a lot of ambivalence and anger about that. I don't have that much ambivalence, actually; I have a lot more anger about it.

**EVA HOOKER:** What is the anger about?

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** I don't like having to learn to talk other people's language and play other people's games before I can feel legitimate within the particular setting. A colleague said to me after a faculty meeting, "You have to feel like an Arab in Israel; you have to think before you talk. You can't just say what you believe or what you think is the truth." This man was saying to me that there is no reward within certain kinds of systems for being straightforward. There is a language that you must learn; there is a way you have to be: not offensive.

**EVA HOOKER:** It is not just the other's language. It is also your own language. You say who you are.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** That would be true if my education had incorporated who I was . . .

**EVA HOOKER:** Right, right. That's the point!

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** . . . and had said to me, "You figure out which parts of you you want to retain and which parts you want to enhance as a working-class woman or whatever." Imagine what we do to people of color or poor people or lesbians when we say to them, "Pretend you're somebody else." Not, "Add on to who you are, or feel empowered to change who you are in ways that you want," but, "Pretend that you're not that person, really. Pretend that you started from nothing and then you made yourself into this terrific being." So, I can say, "My grandmother was a peasant and I have a doctorate and I teach in the university and it was I who did it. I made the best of my education and if I were in Sicily now I'd be barefoot and pregnant." But that means leaving behind Sicily and my grandmother. The person who can integrate where she comes from and where she is and where she is going is a superior individual; I admire people who do that.

**EVA HOOKER:** Yes, but it is the responsibility of the teacher in the classroom and of the curriculum itself to make certain that we learn our own language and experiment with languages in the way that Michelle Cliff does in "Claiming an Identity They Taught Me to Despise." She plays with words—name-calling words, image words—to find what she wants to say about who she is and how it was covered up, about uncovering and shedding.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** The third question picks up on that: How do we deal with these kinds of oppression so that some people don't come out sounding pathetic and powerless and other people—the white, male, privileged heterosexuals—don't seem like morons mindlessly holding on to power?

**EVA HOOKER** There is a prior issue: helping the students to see, in the first place, before they can say anything. I taught two things in a freshman group in the past week. We finished up the Odyssey, and we did Michelle Cliff's chapter, "Claiming an Identity They Taught Me to Despise." I asked the students, "What about the slaves in the Odyssey?" They said, "What

slaves?" And they are all through the Odyssey—slaves, servant girls, soldier slaves, and all kinds—and they didn't even see them! In claiming an identity, Cliff talks about her mother coming to her third-grade classroom and how she feels the other students think of her as different because she is from Jamaica. Her mother has to come to sign something or other, and she doesn't want her mother to know that she feels the shame of being different. The students in my class asked, "Well, why would she feel that way? Why does she feel different? I don't understand why she feels different at all." Having gone through the entire chapter in which she talks about being told, at age twenty-two, that her Grandmother was black, they still could not understand why she feels different. Then we talked about our college and the fact that there are people who sweep the halls, people who clean up the tables, people who serve the food, a whole group of people make the institution run whom they don't see. And how all that has to do with race, class, not seeing—and how if you can't see, you can't talk.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** So we start talking about these issues as they arise in the curriculum, and people think that all we talk about in your literature classes and my education or counseling classes are issues of race, class, and sexual preference. "Don't you have any other content?"

**EVA HOOKER:** Or, "How come you're not doing metaphors and similes?"

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** If these issues were being handled on an institution-wide basis, we wouldn't have to talk about them all the time. If these discussions were happening in the dormitories and in club meetings, in student council, and all through the curriculum, then certain people wouldn't be identified as the people who always talk about race, class, and sexual orientation. . . .

**EVA HOOKER:** "Sister Eva's going to do the slaves. Yeah."

Let's move to the next question: What happens when you leave your group of origin and identification and participate in an institution which is going to make you upwardly mobile? The institution is used by the groups of students who are in it to spiral themselves upward, and the institution almost advertises itself in that way. And that has class assumptions and racial assumptions—and the institution certainly has a way of presenting itself as heterosexual.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** For me the issue is well-addressed in a book brought to my attention by you at the GLCA Summer Institute, The Hidden Injuries of Class, by Sennett and Cobb. This book helps me understand much of my experience. I think that the kind of experience you are talking about happens to most college students: I am somebody when I am at home, and I am somebody else when I am at school, and I am somebody else when I am at camp, and I am somebody else when I am on my summer job—multiple identities and multiple roles. But there is a difference in the sense of alienation and self-hatred that you have to experience when it is clear that the institution devalues your background as inferior, inadequate, non-contributing—as non-existent.

**EVA HOOKER:** Something you have to lose . . .

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** . . . and rise above. And become better than. It is very easy to pick up a certain hypocrisy when you don't belong. You are faced with the choice of cutting yourself off from the group of origin. That explains to me, for instance, why the small number of black students at Washington University hang around together. If they lose that anchor, they've lost the kind of group support that validates who they are. Without it they are floating in space, trying to hook on to another identity which is false.

**EVA HOOKER:** That brings us around again to a curricular purpose: not to have a student lose her sense of who she is because she is an Italian Catholic or a Russian Jew or a black person, but to encourage her to weave the strands of all those identities together with all her new education. At the end of it, she shouldn't feel like she has put on a set of B.A. clothes--and underneath there is this person who doesn't really belong in the tweed jacket. Ultimately, that is perhaps why the issues of race, class, and sexual preference should be integrated: so that the education becomes organic with the woman's experience of herself.

**ANNA DISTEFANO:** That means talking about these issues not as topics--one class per semester on each issue—but as tools with which we examine the curriculum. That means changing. That means doing for ourselves and our students what our own education did not do for us.

**EVA HOOKER:** And that is scary.

# WOMEN, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, AND THE LAW: A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Patricia A. Langley, Sangamon State University

The main topics in this bibliography include abortion, sterilization, contraception, health care, lesbians, and artificial insemination. I have chosen to include lesbian custody cases for two reasons: Lesbians face the risk of losing their children solely because of their sexual preference; and lesbians must take this risk into account in considering whether to have or raise children.

For the uninitiated, a few comments on legal citations[1] are in order. In the citation for the case Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), the first number, 410, represents a volume number; the letters represent the name of the publication that contains the case, the United States Reports; and the next series represents another volume, publication, and page where the same case can be found: in volume 93 of the Supreme Court Reporter at page 705. Finally, the parentheses indicate the year of the decision. This order of volume, publication, page, and date is used for all cases and for law review articles.

What follows are annotations to the leading published (and some unpublished) court decisions, law review articles, and selected material on the law governing the reproductive rights of women. Readers are asked to send critical comments and suggestions for improving this bibliography to: Patricia A. Langley, J.D., Legal Studies Program, Sangamon State University, Springfield, Illinois 62708.

## I. ABORTION

### A. CASES

#### 1) Leading Cases

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973). The abortion decision holding that the constitutional right to privacy includes a woman's ". . . decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739 (1973). Companion case to Roe which struck down restrictions imposed on women seeking abortions because they did not in fact advance the legitimate state interest in maternal health.

#### 2) Consent

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976). First decision which struck down a (Missouri) statute which imposed spousal and parental consent requirements on women seeking abortions.

#### 3) Minors

Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857 (1976). The Court upheld a Massachusetts statute which ". . . prefers parental

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1. Legal citations conform to the rules in A Uniform System of Citation, 13th ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Law Review Association, 1981).

consultation and consent, but . . . permits a mature minor capable of giving informed consent to obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the abortion without parental consultation."

Bellotti v. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (1979). Massachusetts statute which permitted state judges to withhold authorization for an abortion for a mature minor and which required parental notification and consent in all cases of minors was declared unconstitutional.

H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S.Ct. 1164 (1981). Utah law which requires physicians to notify the parents of minors who seek abortions, but which does not give the parents veto power, is constitutional.

4) **Public Funding**

Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 97 S.Ct. 2366 (1976). Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid), states may further a ". . . strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth . . ." by refusing to fund "medically unnecessary" abortions for poor women.

Mather v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2376 (1977). Under the 14th Amendment to the constitution and Roe v. Wade, there is ". . . no limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds . . ." (by not funding "medically unnecessary" abortions, but funding childbirth for indigent women).

Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2391 (1977). "(W)e find no constitutional violation by the city of St. Louis electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions."

Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S.Ct. 2671 (1980). The Hyde Amendment's ban on the use of federal Medicare funds for medically necessary abortions, except to save the life of indigent women, is constitutional.

Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 100 S.Ct. 2694 (1980). In the companion case to McCrae, the Court held as constitutional an Illinois law restricting funding of abortions to those necessary to save the life of the woman.

5) **Restrictions**

Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services v. Bowen, U.S., 101 S.Ct. 2012 (1981). States, in order to protect maternal health, may require all second-trimester abortions to be done in hospitals, even where no hospitals will provide these abortion services.

Thone v. Women's Services, U.S., 101 S.Ct. 3043 (1981). Nebraska law imposing 48-hour waiting period on all abortions is unconstitutional because it unduly burdens the woman's freedom and because no compelling state interest is served by this restriction.

6) **Zoning**

Framingham Clinic v. Board of Selectmen, 373 Mass. 279, 367 N.E. 2d 606 (1977). Massachusetts zoning ordinance which totally excluded abortion clinics held invalid by Massachusetts state court.

West Side Women's Services, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D Ohio 1978), aff'd and remanded, 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 572 (1978). "The (city's) decision to ban abortion clinics from certain areas of the City does not 'unduly burden' either the abortion decision or the physician-patient relationship." The ordinance was upheld.

Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977). A woman's right to decide whether to have an abortion is strong enough to defeat zoning regulations which effectively prohibit all abortion clinics within a municipality.

The Village of Oaklawn v. Stewart Marcowitz, 86 I11. 2d 406, 427 N.E. 2d 36 (1981). The Illinois Supreme Court struck down parts of an ordinance which placed special requirements on "ambulatory surgical treatment centers" which perform abortion, but not on other clinics, because there is ". . . no legitimate state interest for unequal treatment." The Court did uphold a 24-hour waiting period and a $5,000 licensing fee.

B. SELECTED MATERIALS

1) **Books**

Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse, Women Under Attack: Abortion, Sterilization Abuse and Reproductive Freedom (New York: CARASA, 1979; P.O. Box 124, N.Y. 10025).

Eisenstein, Zillah, "The Capitalist Patriarchal State and the Politics of Liberal Feminism," in The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (New York: Longman, 1981).

Gordon, Linda, Woman's Body, Woman's Right (New York: Grossman, 1976).

Holmes, H., Hoskins, B., and Gross, M., eds., Birth Control and Controlling Birth: Women-Centered Perspectives (Vol. I); The Custom-Made Child? Women-Centered Perspectives (Vol. II) (Proceedings of Conference on Ethical Issues in Human Reproductive Technology, June, 1980. Clifton, New Jersey: Humana Press, 1980).

Lader, Lawrence, Abortion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). Another listing under Lader, Lawrence, Abortion II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).

2) **Law Review Articles**

Note, "Abortion Cases in the United States," 2 Women's Rights L. Rep. 49 (1972). A pre-Roe v. Wade list of abortion cases.

Updates, "Abortion Rights of Minors," 6 Women's Rights L. Rep. 13 (1979-80).

Note, "Minor's Right to Abortion and Contraception," 4 Women's Rights L. Rep. 165 (1978).

Note, "Abortion Clinic Zoning: The Right to Procreative Freedom and Zoning Power," 5 Women's Rights L. Rep. 283 (1979).

Dunlap, Mary C., "Harris v. McCrae," 6 Women's Rights L. Rep. 166 (1980).

Isaacs, Stephen L., "The Law of Fertility Regulation in the United States: A 1980 Review," 19 Journal of Family Law 65 (1980-81).

3) **Other Articles**

Glen, Kristin, "Abortion in the Courts: A Lay Woman's Historical Guide to the New Disaster Area," Feminist Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb. 1978).

Hayler, Barbara, "Abortion," Signs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1979).

Petchesky, Rosalind, "Reproductive Freedom: Beyond a Woman's Right to Choose," Signs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer, 1980).

## II. STERILIZATION

### A. CASES

1) **The Right to Be Sterilized**

Hathaway v. Worchester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973). A Massachusetts Statutory ban on sterilization violates the constitution.

Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A2d 574 (1975). A spousal consent requirement for sterilization is unconstitutional.

See Mather v. Roe and Poelker v. Doe as to whether a state or city must provide publicly funded services for indigent women, Abortion, supra.

2) **The Right Not to Be Sterilized**

Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). After 12- and 14-year-old black girls were sterilized through a federally funded family planning program without their consent, the Court ordered HEW to issue regulations restricting sterilizations paid with federal funds. The court held that federally funded sterilizations are constitutional only when undertaken voluntarily and knowingly by individuals capable of consent.

Madrigal v. Quilligan, CA. No. 75-2057, F. Supp. (C.D. Cal. 1975). Ten Chicana women sued Los Angeles County Medical Center for sterilization without their knowledge. (They spoke no English). The court denied them relief, stating that ". . . one can sympathize with them for their inability to communicate clearly but one can hardly blame the doctors . . . ."

3) **"Mentally Retarded" Persons**

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584 (1927). Holding that ". . . three generations of imbeciles are enough . . . ," the Court upheld the sterilization of a "mentally retarded" woman upon the order of the superintendent of a state mental institution. This case has never been overruled.

4) **Judicial Liability**

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978). The Supreme Court held that an Indiana judge who authorized the sterilization of a "retarded" girl at the mother's request and who totally ignored Indiana's procedural safeguards was immune from liability for damages.

B. SELECTED MATERIALS

1) **Books**

Public Citizen's Health Resources Group, Sterilization Without Consent: Teaching Hospital Violations of HEW Regulations (Washington, D.C., 1975).

_____, Sterilization Report Number 3: Continuing Violations of Federal Sterilization Guidelines by Teaching Hospitals in 1979 (Washington, D.C., 1979).

Also see Abortion, supra.

2) **Law Review Articles**

Neuwrith, Heisler and Goldrich, "Capacity, Competence, Consent: Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded," 6 Colum Human Rights L. Rev. 447 (1974-75).

Burgdorf and Burgdorf, "The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons," 50 Temp. L.Q. 995 (1977).

3) **Other Articles**

Westoff and Jones, "Contraception and Sterilization in the United States, 1965-75," 9 Fam. Plan. Perspectives 153 (1977).

III. **CONTRACEPTION**

A. CASES

1) **Leading Cases**

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965). The constitutional "right of privacy" prohibits states from outlawing the sale of contraceptives to married persons.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (1973). "If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons can not be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons (is) equally impermissible."

2) **Minors**

Carey v. Population Services Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010 (1977). Minors have a constitutional right to purchase non-prescription contraceptives.

Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 829, S.Ct. (1980). (The Supreme Court refused to hear this case.) A public family-planning clinic that provided minors with contraceptives without notifying parents did not violate the parents' constitutional rights. HEW has since issued regulations requiring parents to be notified. See H.L. v. Matheson, supra at Abortion.

B. SELECTED MATERIALS

1) **Books**

See Abortion and Sterilization, supra.

2) **Law Review Articles**

Note, "Parental Consent Requirements and the Contraceptive Controversy," 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1001 (1974).

Note, "Sexual Privacy: Access of a Minor to Contraception, Abortion and Sterilization Without Parental Consent," 12 U. Richmond L. Rev. 221 (1977).

Note, "Minor's Rights of Privacy: Limitations on State Action After Danforth and Carey," 7 Colum. L. Rev. 1216 (1977).

Note, "Minor's Right to Abortion and Contraception," 4 Women's Rights L. Rep. 165 (1978).

Isaacs, Stephen, "The Law of Fertility Regulation in the United States: A 1980 Review," 19 Journal of Family Law 65 (1980-81).

## IV. HEALTH CARE

A. CASES

1) **Homebirth**

Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976). The California Supreme Court held that a woman's right to privacy did not encompass the right to choose whom she wishes to assist her in her delivery. Three midwives were convicted for the unlicensed practice of medicine.

2) **Midwives**

Bowland v. Municipal Court, supra.

Commonwealth v. Porn, 80 N.E. 31 (Mass. 1907). Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the conviction of a midwife for violation of a statute prohibiting the unlicensed practice of medicine.

Banti v. State, 289 S.W. 2d 244 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.

1956). Evidence that midwife had assisted woman in childbirth would not support a conviction for unlicensed practice of medicine since childbirth was not a disease but a normal function.

3) **Persons in Delivery Room**

Hulit v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 520 P.2d 99 (Mont. 1974). Montana Supreme Court held a private hospital's rule excluding the husband from the delivery room was proper.

Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975). The right to marital privacy ". . . does not include the right of either spouse to have the husband present in the delivery room of a (public) hospital . . . ."

4) **Medical Profession Monopoly**

Feminist Women's Health Clinic, Inc. v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing denied 591 F.2d 1343 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 924, 100 S.Ct. 262 (1979). After local physicians and residents stopped providing emergency back-up and abortion services for the FWHC due to pressure from the medical society, FWHC sued for restraint of trade under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the court held that their complaint did in fact state a "legal cause of action" and that they were entitled to attempt to prove their case against the medical society.

B. SELECTED MATERIALS

1) **Books**

Ruzek, Sheryl, The Woman's Health Movement: Feminist Alternative to Medical Control (New York: Praeger, 1978).

See also, Abortion, Sterilization, Contraception, supra.

2) **Law Review Articles**

Note, "Midwifery: A History of Statutory Suppression," 9 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 631 (1978-1979).

Note, "Birthright: Homebirths, Midwives and the Right to Privacy," 12 Pac L.J. 97 (1980).

Note, "Natural Childbirth: Rights and Liabilities of the Parties," 17 Journal of Family Law 309 (1979).

Grad, F., "The Anti-Trust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine," Duke L.J. 443 (1978).

3) **Other Articles**

"New Era for Feminist Health Clinics," New York Times Magazine 108 (Nov. 23, 1980).

## V. LESBIANS

### A. CASES

#### 1) Custody

Towend v. Towend, (unpublished Ohio Appeals Court, 1975) reported in 1 Family Law Reporter 2830 (1976). Mother is automatically unfit because she is a lesbian.

Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E. 2d 537 (1973). Award to mother because court found she had "reformed."

Hall v. Hall, No. 55900, Ohio Common Pleas Court, Licking County Division (June, 1974). Custody granted to mother with no restrictions on cohabitation with lover.

In Re Hatzopoulos, No. D-54498, Juv. Court of Denver County, Colorado (1977), reported in 4 Family Law Reporter 81 (1977). After death of the natural mother, the court awarded custody of the child to the mother's lover over an aunt and uncle.

### B. SELECTED MATERIALS

#### 1) Books

Curry, H. and Clifford, D., A Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay Couples (Menlo Park, Cal: Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., 1980). Excellent legal advice in a highly readable format.

National Gay Task Force, Gay Parents Custody Handbook (NGTF: 80 Fifth Avenue, N.Y., 10011; $3.50.)

#### 2) Law Review Articles

Basile, R.A., "Lesbian Mothers," 2 Women's Rights L. Rep. 3 (Dec. 1974).

Note, "Custody and Homosexual Parents," 2 Women's Rights L. Rep. 19 (Dec. 1974).

Note, "The Lesbian Family: Rights in Conflict," 10 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 1007 (1980).

Rivera, R., "Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States," 30 Hastings L.J. 799 (1979).

_____, "Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law," 30 Drake Law Rev. 311 (1980-1981).

#### 3) Other Articles

Hitchens and Thomas, eds., "Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: An Annotated Bibliography of Legal and Psychological Materials," (Lesbian Rights Project, 1370 Mission Street, 4th Floor, San Francisco, Cal. 94103; $1.50).

Green, R., "Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents," 134 American Journal of Psychiatry 692 (June, 1978).

## VI. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

### A CASES

#### 1) Unmarried Women

C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). Unmarried woman who inseminated herself with a friend's semen was ordered to give visitation rights to the father.

Fournier v. Lopez, 47 U.S.L.W. 2765 (Cal. 1979). Court invalidated an oral contract between unmarried couple that man would impregnate woman, but not be responsible for child support. Since "meretricious" sexual services were the basis of the contract, it was held invalid as against public policy.

Roland v. Superior Court, 49 U.S.L.W. 2350, 7 Family Law Reporter 2037 (Cal. 1980). A child could bring a paternity action even though the mother had released the putative father from any claims.

Smedes v. Wayne State University, No. 80-725-83 (E.D. Mich., filed July, 1980). Unmarried woman filed suit against a state clinic when it refused to consider her request for A.I. solely on the basis of her marital status.

#### 2) Married Women

People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man for not supporting an A.I.D. child born, with his consent, during his marriage to his ex-wife.

### B. SELECTED MATERIALS

#### 1) Books

Finegold, W., Artificial Insemination (2nd ed. 1976). This text was first published in 1964 and revised slightly in 1976. No cases from the 1960's or 1970's are included. Caveat: Finegold believes that only heterosexual married couples should have A.I. available to them. He finds an unmarried woman's interest in A.I. "indicative of psychological distress," supra at 101.

See also A Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay Couples, supra at Lesbians.

#### 2) Law Review Articles

Kritchensky, Barbara, "The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination," 4 Harvard Women's L.J. 1(1981).

Annas, G., "Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor," 14 Family L.Q. 1 (1980).

**3) Other Articles**

Case Conference, "Lesbian Couples: Should Help Extend to A.I.D.?", 4 J. Med. Ethics 91 (1978).

Strickler, Keller, and Warren, "Artificial Insemination with Fresh Donor Semen," 293 New Eng. J. Med. 848 (1975).

Curie-Cohen, Luttrell, and Shapiro. "Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States," 300 New Eng. J. Med. 585 (1979).

## REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM RESOURCES

National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL)
825 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

National Religious Coalition on Abortion Rights (NRCAR)
100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse (CARASA)
P.O. Box 124
New York, NY 10025

National Women's Health Network
224 7th Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 543-9222

ACLU Foundation
Reproductive Freedom Project
22 E. 40th Street
New York, NY 10016

National Center on Women and Family Law
799 Broadway, Room 402
New York, NY 10003
(212) 674-8200

Lesbian Mothers National Defense Fund
2446 Lorentz Place, North
Seattle, WA 98109
(206) 282-5789

# THE ART OF QUILTING: THOUGHTS FROM A CONTEMPORARY QUILTER

Joyce Parr, Kenyon College

I speak as an abstract expressionist painter turned quilter. I want to tell you my thoughts and feelings about quilting. Because I am not a professional philosopher or historian or folklorist, and I do not know the languages of all these disciplines, I put my thoughts into personal and perhaps even poetic terms rather than into scholarly arguments.

I love quilting. I have been thinking about it during the hours and hours I spend making tiny stitches all over the surface of a patched fabric. I have thought about what those patches mean, how putting them together is a kind of connecting, expressing other kinds of connectings. The stitches express a sense of time which can be looked at and considered for what it means and has meant through many lifetimes.

I have shared these thoughts with friends who have given me their own perceptions. I have come to know other quilters who, like myself, started in academia and have found their home in this new old medium. I now bring the thoughts I have collected to you, in the spirit of a quilt. You may use the fragments as you will.

First, think about an old form of folk music: contradance music. It came from England, as did patchwork quilting. It is made of patterns, repeated over and over. The notes are short, all the same length, as are quilt stitches. The repetition of pattern and stitches seems to me to be a way of using time and space which, in a profound way, pays homage to both. Both are expressions of a sense of time which is open-ended, which comes from endlessly repeating days past and which can go on indefinitely. There is a sameness, a continuity to it, and a unity. One can look at the past to find out about the present and what to do in the future. Everyday moments have a shape which can be discerned, used, and expressed in art and music.

Contrast this sense of time with the one which is inherent in "high art." In looking through Western art history, one finds that much of the art expresses idealized notions of the world. Everyday reality often assumes heroic proportions. The pace of everyday moments is not the even-patterned, open-ended one which we see in folk art; instead, it strives upwards, towards an ideal. The past is lower, or passe, outdated, rather than a reverenced teacher, or a pattern for the present. In popular art, such as in advertising, films, television, an ideal is set forth as well, albeit a material one. What is past is no longer fashionable; the present is measured in terms of one's hope for material gain. In such a life, we have value according to our possessions, and we ourselves become commodities to be possessed or traded.

Where do we find expressed the sense that our moments have value in themselves, apart from their strivings toward an ideal, whatever it may be?

Are not many of these strivings an inheritance of a culture which was created by men? Women stayed home and tended to the everyday moments, the private and domestic, while men entered the public realm and created an upward-striving culture. Our public art work reflects this attitude; artists

are taught to strive to "make it" in the Art World, competing with other artists, the work they make a commodity in the trade for status. Meanwhile, ordinary people living everyday lives are left with no one to express their moments, give them shape and beauty.

So it seems, until we look again and find that there is a whole world of artistic activity going on unnoticed. Folk artists have always, everywhere, made things to celebrate and decorate their moments. What if philosophers were to stop measuring their truths by works produced by public artists for the Art World and begin to look at folk art as an expression of reality?

I like quilting because it seems to me a place in which everyday life is celebrated, decorated, and given continuity. The sense of time I feel while I am quilting gives me a sense of my own life; I am happy and I feel accepted. Tomorrow will be like today, and today is worth living simply because I am here, alive, making stitches on something I am trying to make as beautiful as I am able. Tomorrow I will keep stitching on it, and for weeks to come, and when it is finished it will contain the moments in which I worked.

Before I began to make quilts, I never believed I could do it. My friends say, "How can you STAND to do all those tedious little stitches?" But I don't find them tedious. The reason I sometimes saw them as such, before, was that I was so goal-oriented, as I had been taught to be by both high and popular culture. In learning to make quilting stitches, I have changed. I see the stitches as symbolic of my transformation from a striving, unhappy, self-doubting insecure artist-in-relation-to-the-Art-World, to a woman who is part of a long tradition of other women like myself who have tried to make the passing moments of everyday life somehow richer, more valuable and beautiful. The stitches count my passing moments, paying them homage.

The piecing as well as the stitching can be seen as symbolic. This putting-together of scraps and fragments of no value has about it something redemptive. In the religion of nineteenth-century rural India, it was recognized that a woman who took her worn-out and ragged saris and embroidered them together was performing an integrative function; she was "stitching herself together."[1] The woman who sat by her fireside after a day of hard labor to keep her pioneer American family fed, clothed, and sheltered, gave visual shape to the countless redemptive acts she and others performed as they made their lives with their own hands. One old quilter told how country women stitched quilts as fast as they could so their families could keep warm, and made them as beautiful as they could so their hearts wouldn't break.[2]

Radka Donnell, a contemporary quilter, says that women as wives and daughters have always been obliged to follow their husbands and fathers, to live in their houses, never having a space of their own, and that a quilt is a space which belongs only to the woman making it. Radka also talks about

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1. Stella Kramrisch, Unknown India: Ritual Art in Tribe and Village, Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1968.
2. Pattie Chase, "Quilting: Reclaiming Our Art," Country Women, 21 (September 1976), p. 9.



**PORCUPINE HILL QUILT**

Joyce Parr 1982

Work in Progress 70" x 70"

Cotton

how a quilt is comforting. Wives and mothers are constantly giving, touching others, she says, and often they get very little touching from others. Quilting has about it a quality of stroking, of softness in texture; when one is finished one can wrap oneself in it. She said that when she was divorced, making quilts gave her a sense that she was able to make decisions about her life, through deciding about colors and shapes and their arrangements.[3]

The patterns and shapes in quilts come out of our everyday lives and in turn affect the way we live. The putting-together of scraps and fragments of no value, making of them something new, is life-giving. In the catalogue for the second exhibit of Michigan folk art,[4] Marsha MacDowell says that the effort to regain the "initiative for life" is what art is all about; creating order and meaning out of our daily moments gives us life. The patterns and shapes in quilts contain the shapes of our lives; they shape our sense of what life is, and in doing so they help life to continue. Folk art is intermeshed with everyday moments, used in the performance of everyday tasks, interjecting a moment of consciousness which contains and expresses those moments, more than art which we must visit a museum to see.

To make art, we must respect our own creativity, have faith in our capacity to make things new. As teachers of art, we have seen how easily and frequently that faith can be lost, and how the teacher can restore that faith through her or his own belief in the students' capacities. As artist-teachers, we pass on this life-giving process of making, creating. Believing that we can put shapes and colors together to decorate our own moments, we use what we have made and share it with others, giving them a sense of what our own life is. That sense then becomes part of their moments and affects the shape their own moments will take. Quilting was always a community art. Patterns were shared, everyone could try them, and each person chose her own colors and shapes and put them together in the ways she liked best. That is still true, at least in Ohio; everywhere I go I meet quilters, or someone who knows someone who quilts. Everyone feels included; quilting belongs to everybody.

When I am quilting I feel connected with generations of women, past and present, who have done the same thing. On another level, I feel connected, in a symbolic way, with all the people with whom I share this time and space, the time I am here on earth. In quilting it is necessary to have respect for every inch of space; if one area is neglected, the batting will get wadded up, the surface marred. An attitude of doing honor to space and time is what I feel. I want to be connected with others, my pieces stitched together with theirs, touching. I want my quilts to comfort them. I want the sharing of time and space that I have with others to be something that is life-giving. To do so I must make my quilts contain my feelings, my moments, in a way that touches and includes the feelings and moments of others.

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3. Radka Donnell, Filmscript for Quilts in Women's Lives, by Pat Ferrero, Oakland Museum of Art, 1981.
4. Marsha MacDowell, Rainbows in the Sky, The Folk Art of Michigan in the Twentieth Century, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1978, p. 13, quoting Lewis Mumford.

Henri Nouwen, a theologian, said that when we are talking to older persons we reach them on the common ground of our own aging.[5] Dorothy Day showed us that to help the poor, we must become poor.[6] We as women teachers teach out of our own need to learn. As artists we share the same space and time with the people we hope will be comforted by our work, and we work from our own need to be comforted.

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5. Henri Nouwen, Aging: The Fulfillment of Life, Doubleday, 1974.
6. Dorothy Day, her life as explained in The Long Loneliness, Harper and Row, 1952, available from the Catholic Worker, 36 East First St., New York 10003.

# TWO IN ONE, ONE IN TWO: AN EXPLORATION OF A BIRTH EXPERIENCE AND IMAGES OF THE SACRED

Ronald L. Massanari, Alma College

The birth of our child began in the creative intimacy of intercourse. Conception is an act of oneness, natural and organic. The mother-father becomes one and in that unity a new oneness is created or generated. What began as mother-father now becomes mother-child. It is only much later that the unity becomes mother-child-father. For the mother it is an experience of oneness and union (the cosmogonic myth). For the father it is an experience of union-separation-reunion (myth of the journey of the hero).

Even before we had decided to have a child, Rhoda and I were interested in natural childbirth. As soon as Rhoda was informed that she really was pregnant, we celebrated the impending new life with mutual excitement and the bottle of wine we had been saving for this occasion. She began exercising in preparation for natural childbirth. I watched her and offered what support I could. For example, I counted her breathing during these exercises. I watched her body change shape during the months that followed, just as I observed her eating patterns changing and her psyche moving in unfamiliar directions. The oceanic context of all life beginnings was formed within her. She experienced change and anticipation from within. I experienced it from without. Her experience "inside outward" was matched with my experience "outside inward."

By mid-term the child's presence was clearly visible to all, but even before that Rhoda could feel the life within. I was quite aware that Rhoda experienced many things in her pregnancy that I could not. Intellectually, I had known of these differing experiences, but experiencing this non-experience made it known to me at the visceral level. Our experiences were different: Hers was in the realm of participation within; mine was primarily in the realm of observation without. Just as I could not experience hers, she could not experience mine. To some extent, at least, biology is destiny.

One evening, while friends were over, Rhoda informed me that the moment was at hand. We became very excited. As we finished dinner with our friends, spaced with timing the contractions, we savored the anticipation of the impending event. Rhoda was going to give birth; we were going to have a child. She knew this by the movements inside her body. I knew this by feeling the contractions with my hand on her stomach. The rhythms of lifegiving had begun their final phase.

As we entered the labor room, we were greeted with screams of pain. In silence, Rhoda and I looked at each other. I saw anxiety in her eyes. The unknown is not only fascinating; it is also terrifying. Both of us hoped that her labor would not be that painful. While she was on the labor bed, we talked, primarily about what was happening to her and to our child within. With increasing frequency, I was called upon to count her breathing during each contraction cycle. I had the distinct sense that such counting was an effort to give these natural rhythms some kind of order and meaning, at least to the observer. After several hours, it was clear that the baby had

made its way downward and was, with Rhoda's help, struggling to get out. The expression on Rhoda's face told me the pain had intensified. Her whole body moved to the rhythms of life, but these were also rhythms of pain. I watched, even sympathetically felt for her, but she felt the movement and the pain. Then the nurse informed Rhoda that the head had crowned.

We rushed to the delivery room. The birth went rather quickly, probably a dozen or so hard contractions. During this process, I was torn between watching the painful contortions of Rhoda's body and the actual expulsion of our baby. In the pain was mystery and in the mystery was pain, or so it seemed as I watched. Rhoda and our child participated in this experience together. While I was there, I had no essential part to play in this drama of birth. The birth rhythm made its final rush and our child emerged crying. The doctor announced that our child was a daughter. Our oneness was now actually embodied. Then I witnessed the transformation from pain to joy, from dramatic action to passive calm, from trial by ordeal to peaceful accomplishment as the doctor put our daughter Nicole in Rhoda's arms. I experienced a great joy, a sense of relief that all had gone well for Rhoda and Nicole as they reenacted the ritual of birth. We laughed and hugged each other. Rhoda and our daughter had played their parts—naturally.

As might be expected, after this ordeal Rhoda was exhausted as well as exhilarated. Even my watching was tiring. Following moments of shared joy—now the three of us—I went home to make the ritual phone calls. Joy reigned supreme as the network of our happiness spread across our families and friends. Yet a strange feeling still lurked inside me: the memory of the pain that was a necessary prelude for this joy and excitement. Interestingly, Rhoda remembers it differently than I do, but experience is not the same as observation.

Sometime later, I returned to the hospital to find our daughter nursing at Rhoda's breast. Proud father feelings rushed through my veins. I had seen madonnas with child before, but never like this. As Nicole sucked, we examined her from head to toe. Rhoda talked about her experience of giving birth, but it was obvious that words cannot contain or convey such experiences. I had similar problems in trying to communicate what my experience of observing was like. Rhoda had also observed the birth, but there is a difference between observing your own actions or happenings and watching these happen to someone else. Her observation of her experience was not the same as my sympathetic identification with her experience. Even so, there was a mysterious bonding beneath our radically different experiences. Somehow, beneath and within these differing experiences, there was a common experience in which, at least intuitively, the observer becomes the participant and the participant, the observer. Clearly, biology is not the sole determiner of destiny.

Prior to birth, the mother-child oneness was within; now it was externalized on the breast. The oceanic waters became the life-nourishing milk. As Nicole nursed, I watched in amazement. In this intimacy, I saw the unfamiliar in the familiar, the familiar in the unfamiliar. Sometime later I tried to bottle-feed Nicole by holding her to my bare chest, an interesting experiment but clearly not the same as sucking at the breast, as Nicole informed me with her cries of frustration. Simulation is artificial. My intimacy with Nicole would have to be established. It was not to be natural and organic.

Part of the pain, frustration, and excitement of the father experience is in the necessity of waiting for intimacy to develop. I consciously began to cultivate relational modes. She seemed to respond, but at these early stages, I was unsure. Relationships depend upon mutuality of response, but her smile often seemed more the result of stomach gas. Frankly, it is hard to build a relationship based on a burp!

In the days and months that followed Nicole's birth, I watched the natural intimacy between mother and child. Vicarious participation in intimacy was a new experience for me. I can remember, almost as vividly as the day of birth, the day I came home and Nicole greeted me with "Daddy." She had recognized me in a unique way. Our intimacy had begun. This was the birth of explicit consciousness and recognition. Something happened inside me that day. A new sense of family was dawning: not one that excluded the natural oneness of mother-child, but one that included the mutuality of relationship. As father, I became one with the mother-child in that first "Daddy." Rhoda laughed and winked at me. She already knew such oneness. Beneath and in our different experiences as mother and father was common experience. Our child embodied this commonness. She is a visible, ever present reminder of our common experience. Even more, she "reveals" the child that each of us was and that still lives inside us.

While in some sense this is uniquely my story—or Rhoda's and my story—it is also, I would argue, an archetypal and universal story. In this birth experience, both the myth of the journey of the hero and the cosmogonic myth are reenacted. The myth of the journey of the hero, an archetypal representation of "masculine experience," frames experience in terms of the linear, external process of the hero departing from "home," encountering a series of external obstacles, and returning "home" after demonstrating to himself and others his personal worth and value as a male. The father experience is analogous to the hero myth in its process of union, separation, and reunion. As a quest journey, the hero myth speaks not of natural happenings, but of things to be done or accomplished, even demonstrated. The process of personal transformation is brought about by external action and conscious, even calculating, effort of the individual. The cosmogonic myth, on the other hand, can be seen as the archetypal representation of "feminine experience." This myth speaks of a natural internal cycle of actualization of what is, at least potentially, already present. Rather than demonstration, the style of the cosmogonic myth is realization, an emergence of personal worth and value from within. The mother experience is analogous to this myth in the sense that "events" happen from within, as an actualization and realization of what, potentially, already is. The process of transformation is something that happens naturally from within.[1] While there is a danger of absolutizing such framing of experience into stereotypic expectations and definitions, these myths, taken as analogies, can help us recognize that, at least for moments in our lives, we—men and women—experience differently. But I would also argue that to listen to the full range of our experiences

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1. Among the sources that develop aspects of this line of thought, see Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton University Press, 1968) and Valerie Saiving, "The Human Situation: A Feminine View," in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, edited by Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow (Harper and Row, 1979).

as individuals—men and women—we need at least both these myths to frame our experience, and probably a number of others as well. While there are differences in our experience as men and women, as these myths reveal, there are also convergences and commonalities. To reject either side, differences or commonness, is to break with the possibilities of listening to the full range of our individual and human experience.

It is on the basis of such stories, personal and mythic, that our perception and imaging are shaped and our experience is understood. As illustrated by this story, if we image reality and experience the sacred predominantly through the masculine father experience, as is traditionally done, then we live listening to our experience primarily in terms of otherness, separateness, and distance. The masculine mode assumes and establishes boundaries; differences rather than commonness are stressed. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, this emphasis is evident in the basic assumption that our primary meaning is found outside ourselves, in the sacred, or God. While father images reflect parts of our experience, the minimizing of the mother images cuts us off from other aspects and dimensions of our experience and our understanding of that experience. The Great Mother is always there: the question is the extent to which we are open to listening to Her. Even in more secularized forms, the Western style assumes that meaning exists outside us, in something external. Something authoritative and other than what I am—for example, social status, quantity of assets, or academic degree--validates who I am.

Such separation is also evident in our sense of alienation from nature and the natural. Nature, no longer our home or Mother, becomes other things to manipulate and use for our benefit and profit. Under the rule of the masculine experience, we have lived by raping Mother Earth or by using her as a weekend play-thing. Because we experience our bodies as natural and part of nature—the realm of the feminine—masculine perception separates our minds (or souls) from our bodies. Since masculine experience does not find a natural or organic intimacy with nature and the body, it fears them and considers them to be a threat. Control and dominance are its responses.

As masculine dominance denigrates nature and women to second-class status or nonentities, dependent upon the masculine and the mind, so it often denigrates our bodily and sexual experience as "evil," or something to be controlled by restrictions or functionalized with the help of manuals on sex techniques. The sacred, perceived to be other than we are, most certainly cannot reside in Nature or the natural or in our bodies. Our bodies and Nature are simply creations of something else outside, usually understood as an intelligent disembodied mind or spirit termed God. This overwhelming sense of separateness and otherness is experienced as a problem to be overcome. Within the masculine experience, relationship based on mutual self-consciousness is the way of resolving separation. That such a relationship is assumed to be possible is illustrated by the Hebrew experience of covenant or the Christian experience of "membership in the body of Christ." The father can become part of the mother-child unity, not by organic or natural identity, but by establishing self-conscious relational bonds. The unity depends upon the acknowledgement of "Daddy" or, in religious imagery, upon "God the Father" or "Cosmic Daddy." This means that while we can relate to what is ultimately meaningful, we are never it ourselves. With a few exceptions, most notably the mystics in both Judaism and Christianity, we

cannot experience a oneness or organic unity with this ultimate meaning or God. Within these traditions, the masculine relational mode, ideally expressed as an "I-Thou," is considered the only possibility. To say that we are that ultimate meaning, or to say "I am it (God)," is either blasphemy or insanity, because such claims violate the relational mode. Thus, in the reality created by absolutizing the masculine experience, identity is forbidden, denied, and excluded as a possible mode of experience.

But if we listen to our story and to our experience, to be cut off from the possibility and reality of identity denies a basic part of the human experience. Living under the reign of the masculine frame of reference means accepting a dangerous and destructive myopia, making it difficult, if not impossible, to listen to and accept the full range of our experience. The masculine mode does reveal and express part of our experience, but only part of it. If we allow this mode exclusive dominion, it hides other parts of our experience, forcing us either to remain oblivious to them or to deny them.

We still must hear from the mother, the child, and the mother-child unity. The feminine experience, even though reflected in our story as mother and mother-child and frequently imaged as the Great Mother, is a dimension of all of us, males and females. It is the experience of natural organic oneness with life and of the very source of life itself. The experience is not relational, but is one of identity, of an at-oneness with the source and meaning of life, of intimate participation with the natural rhythms. There are hints of such feminine experiences even in the overwhelmingly masculine traditions of our forefathers, e.g., the word for "to know God" in the Hebrew text is the same word found in the text where Abraham "knew" Sara and she bore a son (knowing God as intercourse and intimacy), or in St. Paul's understanding of the transforming experience of identity, "no longer I but Christ." The feminine experience, analogous to the experience of the mother and mother-child, is that of listening from within, of internal centering, of oneness and "comm-unity." The self is experienced as unity, without a mind-body split. Nature is experienced as our home because it is our larger body, not separate "things" to be used for our exclusive benefit. Identity and oneness with the ultimate source of meaning is not blasphemous or insane but one of the marks of full humanness and spirituality. While separation is still experienced as a problem, it is not overcome by establishing relationships, but by accepting what is. The Great Mother images that the sacred and ultimate are within, not outside our lives and life itself. The identity is already; it is natural. What is needed is our openness to experience. The perceived problem of separation is simply our unwillingness or inability to become aware and experience the identity that already is. We do not create this identity; it is the very context of our experience. The experience of oneness and unity with what is—and with the source of what is—is simply an awareness and experience of what is. It is, ultimately, the acceptance of what is natural and given.

Just as listening to the father experience alone is damaging and partial, so simply listening to the mother experience prevents listening to the full range of our experience. Masculine without feminine is as fragmented and uncreative as feminine without masculine. Two in One, One in Two. Each individual needs the harmony of both. Separation is lifeless; to be at-one with each other is creative life. To say that we need to listen and experience both is to say also that somehow we must become the child again.

Our experience does include the sense of otherness and separation that can be resolved or reconciled in relationship. But our experience also includes the sense of participation and identity with what is and the source of what is. I would argue that sometimes both sides of experience appear at once and at one, as logically incoherent as that may seem. As long as we accept only one mode of understanding our experience, we remain fragmented and "dis-eased." In the context of our inherited traditions—our views of reality, our language, our styles and conditioned perceptions—it is evident which side we need to cultivate. But to develop the feminine side of our experience should not be simply for its own sake; ultimately, such cultivation makes possible listening to the full range of our experience, especially of ourselves and of the sacred. In order to cultivate the feminine dimensions of our experience, it is very likely that we will need to let go of the dominating masculine style so that we can be open to the feminine without the conditioned and inherited structure of and filters on our experience. In letting go, we can recover or discover our wholeness. The implications of this letting go are legion, not just in terms of the status of women, nature, and our bodies, but in terms of our world view, life styles, values, experienced meaning, structures and institutions.

To think only of female-male equality and success within the present system is to perpetuate the system of masculine dominance. Women, too, can and have become masculinized, denying their feminine experience. This does not happen only to men. The danger of superficial feminism is to buy into the masculine world under the simplistic and reductionistic banner of equal rights. The danger here is to compound the problem by accepting short-term, superficial gains within the established system instead of achieving long-term, fundamental resolution. Maybe both are possible, but to be co-opted into a system of dominance-submission is not the genuine equality envisioned by listening to the full range of our experience, both feminine and masculine.

The point is not simply to be able to image the sacred as maternal and natural, although that is crucial: Opening ourselves to the feminine, and consequently to the full range of our experience, means a comprehensive challenge to the way we have been taught to see things—to experience and organize reality—and to our forms of understanding and expression. By our willingness to explode conventional perception, break structures and expectations, we can open up new possibilities of understanding, communication, and being in the world.

My own attempts to listen to the Great Mother have been frustrating as well as exciting, terrifying as well as revealing, disconcerting as well as comforting.[2] I have found the Great Mother to be a compassionate yet stern guide, never allowing false dependencies on Her and always pushing me beyond where I currently am. My journeys have also opened the possibility of listening to the Great Father (masculine framed experience) again in new ways. I have increasingly realized that the Great Mother and Great Father are, in some strange and curious ways, ultimately identical. Two in One,

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2. See, for example, an account of my long-term dream relationship with the Great Mother, "A Journey with the Great Mother," Anima, VII, 2 (Spring, 1981).

One in Two. While living in many ways in realms beyond my control and understanding, I have become increasingly aware that the Great Mother and Father also live within and in the very midst of my experience. I assume that is so for us all.

## CAN A MAN TEACH WOMEN'S STUDIES?

Cyrus W. Banning, Kenyon College

There is something inherently problematic about being a male teaching a women's studies course, even if he is a feminist. This is particularly true if the course is an interdisciplinary "core" course, but it is also true if the course is a disciplinary one where women's issues are the focus or one where women's issues are "mainstreamed." I want to describe the ways in which being a male in this role has bothered me when I teach "Philosophical Issues in Feminism"—and the extent to which I have been able to quiet my douots.

The problem was first presented to me by Alison Jaggar's "Male Instructors, Feminism, and Women's Studies" (Teaching Philosophy, 2:3-4, pp. 247-256). Two of the challenges she raises are at the core of my uneasiness. The first is that men lack the experience of women. Women's studies material and insight grow, in large part, out of the concrete experience of women. Analyses, feminist and otherwise, must be constantly checked against that experience and if they are false to it they must be rejected. As a man I cannot have that experience. The second challenge I am prepared to take seriously is that a man teaching a women's studies course, or any other, just perpetuates the patriarchial hierarchy: One more time a middle-aged WASP male is running things. To this extent it is true that a man in a women's studies classroom is self-stultifying. These two problems are not just theoretical; they go to the very heart of whether what is supposed to be going on in a women's studies classroom can be going on if a man is teaching.

That "half a loaf is better than none" is the sustaining assumption of my answers to the challenges. Yet if reform in academe is inadequate and we really need to start over, what I am doing cannot be justified; and to that extent I don't really know whether something is better than nothing. Still, I act on the assumption that it is, in spite of my uneasy conscience.

What I can do about the fact that I can never have the experience a woman has is to gather vicarious experience. I talk with women about their lives whenever I can. I read fiction about women, and psychology, and history. I also exploit my own experience to the extent that it is at all analogous to that of women. For example, I have been the object of catcalls, although they were not explicitly sexual, so I do know something of the sudden objectification which results. At the GLCA National Summer Institute in Women's Studies in July, 1981, where I was one of two men among sixty participants and staff, I learned what it is like to be always suspect simply because of my gender. I was consciously aware of it and always ready to explain and justify my presence, although in fact I was seldom asked to do so. In the classroom I use as much experience of this sort as I have, and otherwise use examples from what I have read and heard. Unless I am deluding myself, I believe I can function at an acceptable level without having or understanding all of women's experience. Yet the one thing I can never do is deny the experience of any woman. My credibility and authority are permanently limited by my inability to have that experience.

The second problem—that of displaying and perpetuating the patriarchal structure of society rather than helping to eradicate it—I find harder to

deal with. For the first fifteen or so of my twenty years of teaching, I did my best to trade on and enhance the automatic credibility and authority accorded to a well-educated, articulate WASP male in a position of institutional power. This was, and still is, easy for me. I'm certain I often do it automatically without being at all aware of it. While I do try to undercut and deny unearned authority and credibility, I find it very hard to do, especially when I am caught up in a point of discussion that particularly interests me! How well I succeed in this effort I don't know, so I am forced to rely, uneasily, on my assumption that it is better to have me teach women's studies material in the philosophy department than to have no one do it. Fortunately for my rationale, it is true that if I didn't do it no one else would. It is also true that the textual materials of the course speak for themselves and that most students probably would never read such things on their own. In addition, I hope that my being in the classroom demonstrates what I strongly believe: that it is the responsibility of all people, not just women, to eradicate sexism. In some cases—for instance, when change is needed in a male-dominated institution or discipline—it is peculiarly the men's responsibility. Finally there is a shameful and perverse way in which what causes the difficulty helps to solve it. Whether I like it or not—and I do not—the fact that a WASP male teaches it sometimes confers legitimacy on women's studies. I look for the day when this isn't true, but until then I'll take advantage of that fact.

I think these problems would be significantly lessened for me if I could team-teach the course with a woman. I have yet to do this, but I hope soon to share the teaching of an interdisciplinary women's studies course with a woman. One thing of which I am certain is that I won't teach that kind of course without a woman teaching with me, and without her being at least an equal in running the course, if not in charge.

In conclusion, sometimes I believe that I, as a man, can teach women's studies, and sometimes I don't. I will remain profoundly uneasy about what I cannot know or understand about women's experience and about the dangers of perpetuating the authoritarian white male role. But the rewards are there, too. In teaching women's studies I can bring my personal commitments and my intellectual life together; both are enriched and the satisfactions of greater integrity are great. Added to this is the certainty that what I am trying to achieve is right for everyone, not just me.

# ANALYZING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE LABOR MARKET - A FEW LESSONS FROM JOHN STUART MILL

Robin Klay, Hope College

Many of us are familiar with the writings of John Stuart Mill, the brilliant nineteenth-century exponent of liberty. Recently I have re-read his essay, "The Subjection of Women," in which he explains how in civilized societies women are the last major group still in need of liberation. He moves head-long into the ongoing debate as to whether women are, in fact, capable of doing all that men do in the public sphere.

Laying the groundwork for the rest of his essay, Mill discusses what people have described as the "nature of women." Because they have been forced into a subservient role in the household, dominated by the physical and emotional needs of their husbands, Mill says we unfortunately cannot know what the unfettered nature of women would be. Given their utter dependence on their husbands, he says, women have had every reason to conceal their real feelings. He writes, "What is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others. . . . (A) hothouse and stove cultivation has always been carried on of some of the capabilities of their nature, for the benefit and pleasure of their masters"[1] (p. 148). Hence some aspects of their natures have sprouted luxuriantly in this atmosphere, while others have been stunted because they were "left outside in the wintry air" (p. 148).

Mill says that despite the completely artificial and literally man-made environment in which women have been forced to function, men have never ceased to pronounce on the natural differences between men and women which can be presumed from present differences in their personalities, aptitudes, and interests. He likens this bad logic to a common assumption that the French must be naturally incapable of free government because they are constantly undergoing revolutions. Mill presumably thought that the long history of servitude in France—rather than the French nature—explained their difficulty in rising to the challenges of stable free government. Likewise, he says, women are often thought not capable of taking a lively interest in the "general good" simply because they display no interest in politics. Mill must have been suggesting that women's disinterest in politics stemmed more from social artifact—e.g., no suffrage—than from any natural disposition to care more for their own families than for the general public.

There is no end, Mill thought, to the male presumptions made about different natures, despite the obvious problems of differentiating between the influences of nature and of society in shaping the observable differences between the sexes. In fact, Mill wrote that "it is a subject on which

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1. Reference: "The Subjection of Women" appears in Essays on Sex Equality by J.S. Mill and H.T. Mill, edited by Alice S. Rossi, University of Chicago Press, 1970.

nothing final can be known, so long as those who alone can really know it, women themselves, have given but little testimony. . ." (p. 150).

Mill elaborates on the degree to which men continually fool themselves about how much they know about the nature of women. Great lovers of many women, for instance, presume to be experts on women. Mill admits that these men may know something about one small aspect of female character, but about the rest they know next to nothing, since it will be carefully hidden from them. (One can easily picture here a scene of a pretty woman covering her superior intelligence in order to play up to the domineering needs of a male suitor.)

Mill has greater hope for a man coming to know a woman well when the two are equals in marriage. Even when this rare and beautiful experience is possible, a man should not presume to know "women in general" based on a sample of one woman from one social rank in one culture at one point in time. "We may safely assert that the knowledge which men can acquire of women, even as they have been and are, without reference to what they might be, is wretchedly imperfect and superficial, and always will be so, until women themselves have told all that they have to tell" (p. 152).

About the presumptions men make concerning what occupations are suitable for women, Mill has much to say. He notes that men in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were too conscious of the facts to claim the intellectual inferiority of women; so instead of reasoning that women were unfit for X or Y, they said that keeping women out of certain occupations was necessary for the good of society (no further explanations were deemed necessary). Mill wrote that in his own day "power holds a smoother language." Women were told that for their own happiness and success they should stick to domestic occupations. Mill offers three major arguments in opposition to this prevailing notion:

1. Men cling to the opinion that women are inadequate for pursuing certain occupations primarily because "the male sex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with an equal" (p. 181).

2. It is unjust and socially wasteful to exclude women by birth from "the greater number of lucrative occupations and from almost all high social functions" (p. 181).

3. Although men and women may differ on the average in some skill, it is clear that the distributions overlap in their upper and lower ranges. Thus, to exclude all women is to exclude necessary talent in preference for performance of a task by an inept male. Without using the technical language of comparative advantage, Mill points out that it should make no difference to us if somewhere a man could be found who could do a better job at carpentry or in political office than a particular woman. "Is there so great a superfluity of men fit for high duties, that society can afford to reject the service of any competent person?" (p. 183). (See appendix for an illustration.)

This has turned out to be a long expose of Mill's thoughts about women. However, for many of us—especially economists—Mill's ideas provide a fruitful basis for thought about what we can possibly know concerning the most efficient use of human resources. Mill was very committed to the idea of a natural equality between men and women. In fact, he probably would have interpreted any persistent difference between men and women in wages and occupational distribution as prima facie evidence that discrimination must be taking place—an injustice to women and a great waste to society. The task he would have set before us is to discover at what point discrimination enters:

—Is it in access to special training?
—Is it in the persistence of "all male clubs"?
—Is it in the parental training of very young children?
—Is it in subtle hot-house coaxing of "home economic" talents from girls and mechanical arts talents from boys in the school system?
—Is it in the persistent assumption that child care is the wife's domain, and hence any outside job she has must have hours and flexible schedules that dovetail with the performance of her primary duties as mother and wife?
—Is it in the assumption that taking a full-time job and being willing to relocate are important measures of professional commitment?

There is, of course, another approach to explaining economic differences between men and women or blacks and whites. It begins with the assumption that such groups differ in their willingness to supply labor to various markets. It further assumes that labor market choices reflect different tastes among groups with respect to home or paid jobs, present gratification or future reward, stability or adventure. On the demand side (the employers' choice of workers), differences are presumed to flow primarily from expected productivity, based on estimates of past performance of women as a group. Below are some examples:

—greater or lesser ability in certain job-related skills;
—greater or lesser absenteeism due to responsibilities for children;
—greater or lesser commitment to long-run career development, or preference for mobility.

Economists who take this approach think of relative wages and the male/female employment ratios in certain occupations as being determined by impartial market forces which themselves reflect free individual choices. I am being somewhat simplistic at this point in my description of mainstream neo-classical economists, because some very respected members of this intellectual school do, in fact, study discrimination. They analyze the impact of discriminatory tastes of employers or workers on relative wages, for example. However, I do not think it unfair to characterize their analysis as superficial in that they expect competitive conditions almost inevitably to erode any differences in treatment not based on actual productivity; for example, they expect that non-discriminating employers will get more capable women for the same pay and thereby out-compete discriminating employers. In the end, competition

for female employees would drive up their wages to equality with male employees of the same ability.

This approach is superficial because it fails to appreciate as well as J.S. Mill did how widespread and pervasive are the presumptions made about different natures and hence different tastes and capabilities of men and women, based on evidence of their respective choices and performance in the past. Of course, if the present economic relationships between men and women are thought of as fairly direct images of their natural differences, concern for the greatest efficiency requires a non-interventionist approach (no special legislation, for instance, would be required to equalize employment standards for the two sexes)—the market will take care of itself. On the other hand, if actual employment conditions for the two sexes are very distorted reflections of free individual choices and productivity differences, then greater long-run economic efficiency and respect for individual liberty can be achieved by collective intervention aimed at rectifying the underlying situation. This could take the form of intervention to prevent discrimination in employment and in wages paid, but could also take a number of other forms, including subsidized education and job information and lower tuition rates for categories of students discriminated against.

We owe a belated thanks to J.S. Mill for his analysis of the origins and social costs of discrimination against women. He unmasked subtle social and psychological factors militating against equal treatment of women; and he called for an activist approach toward their dismantling. Economists who pay tribute to their classical roots in the work of J.S. Mill will do well also to consult him on the matter of discrimination, which is still with us more than a century after his call for public policy to combat its deleterious effects on individuals and on society.

## APPENDIX

### COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: OR WHY WOMEN AND OTHERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO WHAT THEY DO BEST (EVEN IF THEIR BEST WERE LESS THAN THAT OF THE AVERAGE MAN)

J.S. Mill is famous for his development of the theory of mutually beneficial trade. Although he did not directly apply that same analysis to the issue of what things men and women should be allowed to do, he was well aware of the link between his free trade argument and his argument for free access to occupations irrespective of sex. What follows is an illustration of that link.

Assume: Alice can bake 1 dozen Cookies per hour, or pound 50 Nails per hour.
Bill can bake 4 dozen Cookies per hour, or pound 100 Nails per hour.

It can be shown that if they strike a bargain to trade Cookies for Nails at the price of 1 doz. Cookies for 30 Nails they will be better off if she

only pounds Nails and he only bakes Cookies:

1. He will have a good bargain because he buys 30 Nails for only 1 dozen Cookies (as compared to his own opportunity cost of 1.2 dozen for 30 Nails).

2. She also will have a good bargain, because she is getting 1 dozen Cookies for only 30 Nails (as compared to her own price of 50 Nails for a dozen Cookies).

So, he gets cheaper Nails and she cheaper Cookies than they would if they each "did their own things" without trade (i.e. pursued both activities separately).

The welfare of this "world of two" is enhanced by trade even though he is (in absolute terms) more efficient at both baking Cookies and pounding Nails.

MORAL: It's silly (means a lower standard of living) if the most talented people do everything at which they have an absolute advantage when a mutually beneficial trade could be made—such that they would stick to doing what they each did much better than average and leave the other things to be done by lesser stars.

COROLLARY: If men could do a whole lot better at plumbing than women, and were a little bit better than women as legislators, it would still be inefficient to reserve unto themselves both jobs. A simple trade based on comparative advantage would allow women to do the legislative work and men to do the plumbing. The general welfare of the community would be greater as a result—MORE GOOD DRAINS AND MORE GOOD BILLS!

## CLOSING PANEL PRESENTATION*
## WOMEN'S STUDIES AND THE RE-VISION OF LIBERAL EDUCATION: "WHAT IS A NICE GIRL/BOY LIKE YOU DOING HERE?"

Jane Dickie, Hope College

It is the closing panel's job to pull together the threads of this conference and weave them into a coherent whole, but after this particular conference, I prefer the notion of putting together a quilt. Each participant has attended his or her own selection of sessions. Now we see that the sessions not only stand beautifully alone, but together form a whole image. They affect one another. The title of our closing panel is "Women's Studies and the Re-Vision of Liberal Education: What Is a Nice Girl/Boy Like You Doing Here?" As I thought about this title, which Beth Reed suggested before we knew what we would say and before we knew what nice girls and boys like us were doing here, I began to reflect on what nice colleges like ours are doing here. With this in mind, I will speak within the context of our consortium of liberal arts colleges.

As I think about the "re-vision" of liberal education, I reflect on the years I have been coming to these conferences and how some of the words we use have changed. We began by talking about integrating women's studies concepts into the curriculum. For me, that image is of a patchwork quilt that has not been sewn together: separate chunks, near each other but not touching, not having any impact or effect on the chunks around them; separate concepts which do not touch the curriculum or the campus as a whole. We have found that this is not what we ultimately want. Perhaps a better image is one in which we are changing the lenses through which we view the world: women's studies as a re-vision of the liberal arts. Rather than dealing with the separate issues in oppression, or inserting the women's studies material on gender, race, class in small doses, we must fundamentally change the way we look at the whole of liberal education. Rather than saying, "Today we are going to deal with racism," and then dismissing race as irrelevant to the rest of the course, we would encourage continual critique of racist methodologies and content in all subject areas. We would look through lenses which change the fundamental way we see the world around us and the way we analyze what is presented to us.

We need to use this re-vision to examine ourselves, too. I made the comment last night in the session on "Combating Racism" that trying to see limits in our own vision is like trying to see our own eyeballs: we can't do it without a mirror. As we assume new ways of seeing the world around us, women's studies will be our mirror. It will also help us look at our own limitations. The need to criticize and evaluate ourselves, as well as the curriculum, was emphasized in the discussion following the "Critical Issues" session. That session encouraged us to experience within ourselves that which the dominant culture defines as Other. This means really seeing both who we are and what the dominant culture says we are. The re-vision means being sensitive.

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* Included here is an edited version of the panel presentation which was submitted for publication. The other panelists were Cynthia Secor, HERS Mid-Atlantic, and Susan Gore, National Women's Studies Association.

This particular sensitivity requires us to stop condemning those whom we perceive as different from us, but it is more than that. The re-vision means to stop congratulating ourselves for whatever privileged heritage is ours. And we stop pretending that we've pulled ourselves up by our bootstraps and can now ignore our group of origin, or our sisters who are still defined as Other. Without the re-vision, upper-middle-class persons congratulate themselves for having middle-class values; or heterosexual persons congratulate themselves on being heterosexual. But what of our own insensitivities? We see feminists congratulating themselves on being "birthright" feminists; we see GLCA faculty and students condemning schools that don't have women's centers or women's studies majors when, in fact, their own centers were established five years prior to their own arrival on the campus. They congratulate themselves for a heritage for which they were not the pioneers. It was given to them. The re-vision must include sensitivity that allows us to offer support to others, instead of condemnation. The re-vision must allow us to experience the Other within ourselves and allow us, with honesty, to criticize the curriculum, while we also criticize ourselves.

We need to look very carefully at the world around us and see ourselves as part of that world. We need a new analysis for old problems: not an analysis that is limited to a specific area in the curriculum, or only to "others," but one which leads to a feminist re-vision of that world.

Seventh Annual GLCA Women's Studies Conference
**TOWARD A FEMINIST TRANSFORMATION OF THE ACADEMY: III**
November 6-8, 1981
Geneva Conference Center
Rochester, Indiana

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6

1:30 P.M. Film and Videotape Showings:

The Life and Times of Rosie the Riveter (film)—This award-winning film depicts the life of women who were employed during World War II, when an unprecedented demand for new workers changed, nearly overnight, notions of what was proper for women. "Rosie the Riveter" became the symbol of those women who were "patriotically" assuming "male" jobs in industry. When the war was over, these women were fired or urged by the massive media campaign to give their jobs back to the men and return to the home. This film could be used in history, economics, psychology, sociology, and women's studies classes.

Pinks and Blues (videotape)—This award-winning videotape, which reports research on the influences of sex-role development from infancy through adolescence, could be used in sociology, psychology, and women's studies classes.

Georgia O'Keefe (videotape)—This on-camera interview with this extraordinary woman and artist could be used in art and women's studies classes.

4:00 P.M. Keynote Address:

Winter Wheat: Preparing for the Eighties—Cynthia Secor, English and Higher Education Resource Services Mid-Atlantic, University of Pennsylvania.

7:00 P.M. Concurrent Sessions:

Minorities, Women, and the Media: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Women's Studies—The session will examine ways in which we can look at the access of women and minorities to the media and their portrayals in the media as an example of discrimination against these groups in society. The focus will be on issues which are readily visible in the media and which transcend a variety of disciplinary concerns. One of the purposes of this program will be to illustrate how certain units, which focus on the media, can be used in a number of courses as pedagogical tools.--Suzanne Condray, Speech Communication, Denison; T. Kimberlie Cromwell, Admissions, Denison; Grace McDade, Student, Denison.

Women in Science: Choices—Many exceptional women have made and are making contributions to science. However, their experiences have not been readily available to other women, even those considering science careers. The opportunities available, the choices made, the challenges met by women of other generations provide a rich heritage for young women now making similar choices and faculty trying to assist them. This

session will share the results of interviews with Ohio women born before 1910 who have made contributions, avocationally or vocationally, in the fields of natural science.—Janet Varner Jenks, Glen Helen Preserve, Antioch.

The Word is Out (film and discussion)—This film examines the lives of several lesbians and gay men. Their frank discussions about their past, the prejudices which they face, and their struggles to be honest with themselves are moving and enlightening for all of us. A discussion will follow the 45-minute film.—Cynthia Secor, discussion leader.

Sexual Harassment: What Are We Doing About It?—Sexual harassment is a means of maintaining patriarchal power. It is a legal, moral, and personal issue. This session will focus on a range of institutional responses to the problem. Drawing on our experiences within our own institutions, we will look at written documents (policy statements and grievance procedures); strategies for educating colleagues and students; barriers and ways of overcoming them; problems in constructing definitions. Our primary—though not exclusive—concern will be with faculty-student relations.—Ann Fitzgerald, English and Women's Studies, Denison; Diane Vreuls, Creative Writing, Oberlin.

"It's a Rhythm": Women & Creativity—A slide presentation will explore the relationship of women to the creative process through contemporary art.—Marcia Wood, Art, Kalamazoo.

Women's Issues in the Reagan Revolution: Seen But Not Heard?—Based on her experience as a Lilly Faculty Fellow working for the Congress Women's Caucus, the speaker will address the following questions: How are women and women's issues faring amid budget cuts and regulatory reforms? What is happening to the Women's Educational Equity Act, the Women in Science Program, Title IX, student loans and grants, abortion, ERA, the Domestic Violence Act, and the Economic Equity Act? How will funding cuts in the Women's Bureau, family planning, and other federal programs affect women? What is the philosophy behind recent moves? And how are the women of Congress and feminist advocates in Washington organizing and responding to the increasingly conservative trend?—Alice Shrock, History, Earlham.

8:30 P.M.

Evening Event—In an informal setting, members of the conference community will read from their own work as well as from new feminist literature.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 7

9:00 A.M. Community Meeting

This meeting provides an opportunity to make announcements and brief reports of general interest and to raise women's studies issues that participants consider especially important to address throughout this conference and within our colleges.

10:00 A.M. Disciplinary Sessions:

Natural Sciences—Work being done at Denison (and supported by a Mellon Foundation grant) will be shared in the form of (1) an annotated bibliography on feminist critiques of science, (2) a paper being completed by a 1981 biology graduate on the same topic, (3) plans for a weekend retreat for GLCA women scientists to discuss issues of common concern (teaching, career paths, research support, etc.). We hope that others will share resources and ideas about feminist approaches to the natural sciences and join in planning for the workshop.—Juliana Mulroy, Biology, Denison.

Literature—The discussion will focus on our need and/or desire for closer affiliation through a newsletter or having a person to coordinate interests. Other issues of common concern will be addressed.—Gail Griffin, English, Kalamazoo.

Humanities and Fine Arts—Ways to integrate women and women's issues into the humanities and fine arts classrooms will be the focus of a group discussion. Materials and strategies will be shared. We will also discuss the possibility of a network to share resources within the GLCA.—Marcia Wood, Art, Kalamazoo.

Social Sciences—Ways to integrate women and women's issues into the social science classroom will be the focus of a group discussion. Common concerns and interests will be discussed as well as materials and strategies shared.—Don Luidens, Sociology, Hope.

Student-Life Professionals—Student services, professional interest, counseling, career planning and development will be examined in this group session. Issues of concern to people responsible for these areas will be discussed.—Susan Crim, Student Development, Earlham.

11:15 A.M.

*Critical Issues in Women's Studies: Race, Class, and Sexual Orientation: A Dialogue—Eva Hooker, C.S.C., Associate Dean of the Faculty and English, Saint Mary's College (Notre Dame, Indiana) and Anna DiStefano, Education, Washington University. Following the dialogue, open discussion will be led by Barbara Caruso, English and Women's Programs, Earlham.

1:30 P.M. Concurrent Sessions:

Institutional Responses to Affirmative Action—Administrators discuss problems faced and approaches used in achieving affirmative action objectives: how to recruit and retain women and minorities; and how to work with departments and individual faculty members.—Jon Fuller, President, GLCA; Lou Brakeman, Provost, Denison; Jack Nyenhuis, Dean of Humantities and Fine Arts, Hope; Donna Scott, Assistant to the President for Equal Opportunity, Kenyon.

*Combating Racism—Racism is an often unrecognized problem at our predominantly white colleges. This session, using a workshop format, will define the difference between prejudice and racism, and explore conscious and unconscious racism in individual attitudes and institutional practices. We will focus on our own attitudes and actions we can take on our own campuses to combat racism.—Jane Dickie, Psychology, Hope; Donn

Marshall, Residential Life Coordinator, Ohio Wesleyan; Barbara Caruso, English and Women's Programs, Earlham.

White Men and Black Women: Transforming a Traditional Course—One teacher will explain how he changed a traditional introduction to literature course by systematically comparing famous white male writers with lesser-known black female ones, thereby encouraging students to see the bias of the traditional literary canon. Following a brief response, the audience will discuss strategies for transforming the traditional courses in their own disciplines.—John Schilb, English, Denison.

Quilting: Art and Craft—This session will explore the history and traditions of quilting from the 19th century to the present. Using slides and actual quilts, we will examine images of Amish, Anglo-American, and Black American quilts, with these questions in mind: How has quilting affected women's lives? What are the relationships of quilting to folk music, literature, and architecture? Why has quilting become a feminist concern?--Marianne Whelchel, Literature, Antioch; Joyce Parr, Art, Kenyon.

Cross-Cultural Research on Gender Roles—Two papers will be presented. The first, "Is Education More Important for Boys or for Girls?", is the result of a series of essay contests asking this question in rural and urban boys' and girls' schools in and around Guadalajara, Mexico. The second, "A Comparison of Puerto Rican and American Attitudes Toward Women," documents the responses to questions such as: Are women more liberal than men? Are Americans more liberal than Puerto Ricans? Was there agreement within and between cultures about desirable masculine and feminine traits?—Marigene Arnold, Anthropology, Kalamazoo; Margaret Berrio, Psychology, DePauw.

Feminist Counseling—This session begins with a brief examination, within a feminist framework, of the general goals of counseling. Through several structured exercises, participants will examine the difficulties of problem definition, choice of theoretical approach, and decisions for action. A critical examination of "empathy" as a primary counseling skill forms the last portion of the session. Suitable for all potential helpers or clients.--Anna DiStefano, Education, Washington University.

Being Here I & II: I. Male-Female Relations; and II. Race Relations--The use of Psychosocial Drama as a tool to promote better understanding among students about Male-Female Relationships and Race Relations will be shown with the use of videotaped vignettes. "On-campus" use involves live student presentations about real campus experiences as topics for group discussion. The presentation will deal with use of Psychosocial Drama (value, uses, how to) and examples of PSD programs.—Syd Schnaars, Student Y and Women's Resource Center, Ohio Wesleyan.

3:15 P.M. Concurrent Sessions:

*Toward A Feminist Transformation of the Classroom—This session will be a workshop in which participants work on their own goals for the feminist classroom. Do feminists need a new definition of power? What are some of the problems we encounter once we decide to transform our classrooms? How can we recognize and address differences in expectation students,

teachers and administrators have of the classroom?—Nan Nowik, English and Women's Studies, Denison; Barbara Caruso, English and Women's Programs, Earlham.

Religion and the Female Image/A Journey with the Great Mother—Through an exploration of dream, birth experiences, and religious language, this paper will illustrate a journey with the Great Mother—Ronald Massanari, Religion, Alma College; Eva Hooker, C.S.C., Associate Dean of the Faculty and English, Saint Mary's College (Notre Dame, Indiana).

The Role of Men in the Transformation of the Academy: When Is a Vanguard Not a Vanguard?—This session explores the implications of being a male feminist in terms of classroom experience, administrative decision-making, personal counseling, and two-career family "logisticating."—Don Luidens, Sociology, Hope; Cyrus Banning, Philosophy, Kenyon; John Schilb, English, Denison; Lou Brakeman, Provost, Denison; Jim Slager, Counseling, Albion.

*The Call for Feminist Theory: Is There an Answer?—This session will explore questions about feminist theory from an interdisciplinary perspective. What is feminist theory? What is the difference between feminist theory and feminist theorizing? Could there be such a thing as a single overarching theory for feminism? What would it be like? Would such a theory resemble socialist theory?—Joan Straumanis, Philosophy, Denison.

AIAW: Political Issues in Women's Athletics—Women's athletics has had an incredible struggle to develop strength in programming and prestige. Now that the programs are functioning and in place, competition is developing between the major national organizations for women's athletics. The future is unclear, but the issues are important. This session will examine those issues.—Anne Irwin, Physical Education, Hope.

"This Bridge Called My Back": A Presentation from the GLCA Conference on Women of Color—What began as a reaction to the racism of white feminists soon became an affirmation of the commitment of women of color to our own feminism. The session will be a discussion of issues that emerged from the conference.—Beth Reed, GLCA Women's Studies Program; Marianne Whelchel, Literature, Antioch.

6:30 P.M. Concurrent Sessions:

Achievement Motivation in Women—A recent attempt to develop a measure to assess achievement motivation in women has given rise to a familiar issue: Is achievement motivation in women and men the same? Do women fear success? This session will explore these isssues in the context of current research.—Don Ryujin, Psychology, DePauw.

Women, Reproduction and Law—This session will present a lawyer's view of the legal rights of women with regard to reproduction.—Pat Langley, Legal Studies, Sangamon State University.

So What's This Institute All About?—This session, with use of cinema verite, looks at the GLCA National Summer Institute in Women's Studies.

The institute's emphasis on feminist teaching and theory leid participants to a new understanding of our limited view and the need to examine our assumptions as we help students to broaden their perspectives.—Sandy Zagarell, English, Oberlin; Joyce Parr, Art, Kenyon.

Latin American Women in Fiction and History—Presentations will be offered on female stereotypes in the Latin American novel, aspects of Mexican feminism up to 1940, and the emergence of women's art in 20th century Chile.—Caroline Richards, History, Earlham; Anna Macias, History, Ohio Wesleyan; Charles Piano, Latin American Studies, Kenyon.

Economics: It's Not Value Free—Economics do not occur in a value vacuum. Two presentations will make this clear: "Economic Advantages of the Male Club" and "Keeping Them in Their Place: Self-fulfilling prophesy in the choices we make concerning the use and development of human resources."—Robin Bartlett, Economics, Denison; Robin Klay, Economics, Hope.

Homophobia Workshop—Our culture and the institutions in it make honest, open discussions about homosexuality very difficult. The biases and fears about lesbians and gay men are deeply ingrained. This workshop will give us an opportunity to understand and come to grips with our own attitudes about and fears of homosexuality.—Cynthia Secor.

*Combating Racism: (Repeated Session)—Racism is an often unrecognized problem at our predominantly white colleges. This session, using a workshop format, will define the difference between prejudice and racism, and explore conscious and unconscious racism in individual attitudes and institutional practices. We will focus on our own attitudes and actions we can take on our own campuses to combat racism.—Jane Dickie, Psychology, Hope; Donn Marshall, Residential Life Coordinator, Ohio Wesleyan; Barbara Caruso, English and Women's Programs, Earlham.

8:30 P.M.

Concert by Ginni Clemmens—Ginni is a feminist folk philosopher, whose songs concentrate on inner feelings rather than on being a woman per se. She believes in music as a healing force.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 8

9:00 A.M. Concurrent Sessions:

*Strategies for Institutional Change—How does the feminist transformation really happen? This session examines some of the strategies for change.--Sandy Zagarell, English, Oberlin; Kaaren Courtney, Romance Languages and Women's Studies, Ohio Wesleyan; Ann Fitzgerald, English and Women's Studies, Denison; Donna Scott, Women's Academic Coordinator, Kenyon.

International Feminism—This session will examine feminism in several different cultures, including those of Germany, the French-speaking world (emphasizing Third World countries) and Mexico today.—Gisela Strand, Foreign Languages and Literature, Hope; Margaret Fete, Romance Languages, Ohio Wesleyan; Anna Macias, History, Ohio Wesleyan.

The Recent History of Contraception—The traditional attitude that contraception is the woman's problem has led many researchers and physicians to overlook the dangers of certain contraceptive products. Issues include chemical poisoning from spermicidal jellies and creams; connections between extended use of oral contraceptives and liver cancer; uterine burn caused by using microwave ovens while wearing I.U.D.'s; and decreased effectiveness of spermicidal suppositories associated with the female-superior coital position.—Bonnie Lamvermeyer, Biology, Denison.

Feminist Approaches to Career Education for Women Students: The Mellon Model--This session will explore particular issues regarding women and careers and will describe interventions and programmatic responses, drawing examples from Denison's Mellon Program on New Career Opportunities for Women.—Mary Schilling, Mellon Program Coordinator, Denison; Juliana Mulroy, Biology, Denison; Robin Bartlett, Economics, Denison; Becky Pschirrer, Student, Denison.

Still Crazy After All These Years: A Feminist Approach to Madness in Women's Literature.—Madness is a persistent theme in women's lives and art. As a concept defined by the dominant culture it has been a powerful and oppressive label applied to women's anger, their irrationality, even physiology. In literature women have often reclaimed and redefined madness. We will look at madness in women's poetry and fiction as an escape from the pressures and distortions of patiarchal "sanity" and as a particularly female medium for redefining the self and creating new forms.--Barbara Caruso, English and Women's Programs, Earlham; Gail Griffin, English and Women's Studies, Kalamazoo.

Feminism & Religion—Two papers look at Christianity from a feminist perspective: "Judeo-Christian Myths of Feminine Evil," and "Reinterpreting the Idea of Love."—Joan Novak, Religion, Denison; Linell Cady, Religion, Saint Mary's College.

11:00 A.M. Closing Panel:

Women's Studies and the Re-Vision of Liberal Education: What Is a Nice Girl/Boy Like You Doing Here?—Jane Dickie, Psychology, Hope; Susan Gore, National Coordinator of the National Women's Studies Association; and Cynthia Secor.

12:30 P.M. Buffet Lunch - Conference Ends

* These sessions are in part an outgrowth of the GLCA National Summer Institute in Women's Studies.